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RECRIMINATION




Under the doctrine of recrimination a defendant in a di-
vorce action establishes a good defense by showing that the
complainant is himself guilty of misconduct constituting a
ground for divorce.' In other words "[I]f both parties have
a right to a divorce, neither of the parties has."2 This doc-
trine is capable of producing some remarkable results, as
the following three cases illustrate: Mathewson v. Mathew-
son,3 Dunn v. Dunn4 and Wells v. Wells.5
The parties in the Mathewson case married in 1853 and co-
habited until 1861, when respondent (husband) left petitioner
and enlisted in the Union Army. Except for two letters which
she received shortly after respondent left, petitioner heard
nothing from or about respondent for twenty-seven years,
and during this period she assumed that he was killed in the
Civil War. In 1872 petitioner wedded J. P., and the two
cohabited until 1892. In 1889 respondent returned to the area
with a wife and children, and petitioner learned of his re-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Akron College of Law. B.A.
Wayne State University; LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., Duke University.
1. 1 W. NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 10.01
(1945); G. CLARK, Do ESTIc RELATIONS 60 (1954).
Since recrimination is considered an affirmative defense, the defendant
should formally plead recrimination if he wishes to rely upon the doctrine.
24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 319 (1966); 27A C.J.S. Divorce
§ 114 (1959). However, it is generally recognized that the court may apply
recrimination although it has not been pleaded if the plaintiff's own plead-
ing or evidence discloses that he is guilty of a matrimonial offense. Young
v. Young, 94 N.J. Eq. 155, 119 A. 92 (1922) ; 1 W. NELSON, supra § 10.10.
Furthermore, in a few states which have a strong equity tradition the court
may invoke the doctrine, whether pleaded or not, whenever plaintiff's guilt
is in any manner brought to its attention. Street v. Street, 48 Del. 272,
101 A.2d 803 (1963); Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171, 117 A.2d 850
(1955); McElwee v. McElwee, 171 Ore. 462, 139 P.2d 208 (1943); A.
JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIc RELATIONS 445
(4th ed. 1961).
2. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 67 (1959).
3. 18 R.I. 455, 28 A. 801 (1894).
4. 156 Miss. 132, 125 So. 562 (1930).
5. 73 N.J. Super. 545, 180 A.2d 356 (1962).
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appearance in 1890. In 1892, following a consultation with
an attorney, petitioner ceased cohabitation with J. P. and
filed for a legal separation from respondent, charging deser-
tion and cruelty. After noting that petitioner had continued
cohabitation with J. P. for two years after learning that
respondent was alive, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ap-
plied the recrimination rule and affirmed a judgment dis-
missing the petition, saying:
By continuing to live with him [J. P.] after the
return of the respondent, she certainly forfeited all
legal claim to the support of the latter.., and hence
is in no position to complain of the wrongs committed
by him .... It appearing, then, that the petitioner,
whether equally guilty with the respondent or not,
has been guilty of conduct which would be a suffi-
cient ground for divorce, she is not entitled to the
relief prayed for in her petition.
6
The plaintiff in the Dunn controversy married defendant
in 1902, and the two lived together until 1906, when de-
fendant (wife) deserted plaintiff. Approximately one year
later plaintiff saw defendant on one occasion and learned that
she was living with another man as the latter's wife. After
another year passed, plaintiff, relying upon the advice of
friends that he was free to remarry, wedded J. T. He sub-
sequently fathered a daughter by her, and dwelled with her
for eighteen years. When he finally learned of the continued
validity of his marriage to defendant, plaintiff separated from
J. T. and sued for a divorce from defendant, relying on the
ground of desertion. The Supreme Court of Mississippi af-
firmed a decree of dismissal, speaking as follows:
In the case at bar, the appellant [plaintiff] ad-
mitted that he contracted a second marriage and
cohabited with his second wife for a number of years,
knowing all the while that his first wife was alive
... but he contends that the principle of recrimi-
nation is not available to defeat his right to a di-
vorce, for the reason that he, in good faith, believed
that he had the legal right to contract a second mar-
riage .... The proof offered to show good faith dis-
closes no mistake of fact, but merely a mistake of
6. 18 R.I. at 455, 28 A. at 801-02.
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law, and consequently is not available as justification
for his matrimonial offense.7
The parties in the Wells case were married in 1929, and
they dwelled together until 1933, when defendant (wife) de-
serted plaintiff. In 1944 plaintiff, having heard nothing from
or concerning defendant for eleven years, concluded that she
was probably dead and married R. W. In 1961 plaintiff learned
that defendant was still living and that she had not divorced
him. He thereupon sued for a divorce on the ground of de-
sertion. However, he continued to cohabit with R. W. while
waiting for the divorce action to be heard. Although the suit
was uncontested, the New Jersey Superior Court invoked the
defense of recrimination on its own initiative and dismissed
the case. Quoting from the opinion:
Both logic and the apparent trend of the authorities
lead to the same result where the complaining party,
though innocent at the outset, continues to cohabit
with the defendant after learning of the illegality of
the relationship.8
The court is of the opinion that the defense of re-
crimination under the facts of this case has been
established.
... [E]ven though the plaintiff and Ruby [R. W.] may
have cohabited innocently at the time of their mar-
riage, since the presumption of innocence has been
destroyed and since plaintiff and Ruby have con-
tinued their marital relations after learning of Mat-
tie's [defendant's] physical existence, the court can
reach no other conclusion than that these parties
committed adultery.9
A doctrine which leads to results of the kind indicated above
would seem to merit close examination. The purpose of this
paper is to undertake such an examination. The material
comprising this study is (excluding the Introduction and Con-
clusion) divided into four major sections. The first part
7. 156 Miss at 132, 125 So. at 562-63.
8. 73 N.J. Super. at 548, 180 A.2d at 358, quoting from Endres v.
Grove, 34 NJ. Super. 146, 148, 111 A.2d 638, 640 (1955).
9. 73 N.J. Super. at 548, 180 A.2d at 358. This decision, after being
affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, was reversed in
1964 by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on the ground that the trial
court should not have raised the issue of recrimination on its own initiative.
41 NJ. 594, 198 A.2d 442 (1964).
6871968]
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discusses the present status of recrimination in American and
English law. The second section treats of the "legalistic" (or
technical) reasons advanced by the courts to justify applica-
tion of the doctrine. Since one of these reasons is the rule's
historical respectability, section two includes a discussion of
the history of recrimination. Part three deals with the policy-
oriented reasons offered by the courts in support of the rule.
And section four considers the various statutory and judicial
reforms of the doctrine which have been accomplished in
recent years.
II. PRESENT STATUS OF RECRIMINATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
The recrimination principle currently exists in the divorce
law of all American jurisdictions but five.10 However, the
doctrine does not take the same form in all jurisdictions. On
the contrary, nine different concepts of recrimination are
discernible in American divorce law. These nine concepts-
or variations-may be stated as follows:
(1) A plaintiff seeking a divorce on the ground of adultery
shall be denied relief if it is disclosed that he is also guilty
of adultery. Sixteen states have enactments so providing."
The acts of Arizona and Florida are illustrative:
A. In an action for divorce on the ground of
adultery, if the plaintiff has been guilty of the same
offense.., it shall be a defense and bar against the
action.' 2
No divorce shall be granted unless one... of the
following facts appears:
10. The five exceptions are: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-4 (1960);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.120 (1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-10 (1965);
OErA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1275 (1961)- WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.150
(1966). These statutes discussed in pt. V(D) infra.
11. Ai CODE tit. 34, § 26 (1959); ALAS. STAT. § 56-5-11 (1958); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-813 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1528 (1953);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65-04 (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 11 (Smith-
Hurd 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-1202 (1965); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit.
166, § 55 (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.08 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.030 (1952); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-7 (1952); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
171 (1964) On. REV. STAT. § 107.070 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 23,
52 (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-811 (1955); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. art.
4630 (1960). The Minnesota act differs significantly from the others, for
it states that the court "may" (rather than "shall") deny a divorce to an
adulterous applicant. This wording gives the court discretion to apply or
ignore the recrimination doctrine, as it chooses. The statute is set out in
pt. V(A) infra.
12. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-313 (1956).
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(3) That defendant has been guilty of adul-
tery, but if it appears that . . . both parties
have been guilty of adultery, no divorce shall be
granted.U8
Remarkably enough, only three 4 of the sixteen states hav-
ing this type of enactment actually limit application of re-
crimination to the situation where both parties are guilty
of adultery. Notwithstanding the restrictive wording of their
statutes, the courts of the remaining thirteen jurisdictions
recognize the defense in other fact situations as well-gen-
erally in any instance in which both spouses are guilty of
a divorce ground.' 5 The courts of these jurisdictions ap-
parently take the view that recrimination is a part of their
common law and that the statute declaring the rule to be
applicable in the adultery-versus-adultery situation was not
intended to imply that the doctrine is inapplicable in other
situations. 6 Thus in Huter v. Huster,17 where the defendant-
wife based a plea of recrimination on her husband's alleged
desertion, the court said:
The doctrine of recrimination... ultimately came
to America as unwritten law. In New Jersey the
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.041 (Supp. 1968). Notwithstanding the man-
datory phrasing of this enactment, the Supreme Court of Florida has ruled
that recrimination is a discretionary doctrine in Florida. Stewart v. Stew-
art, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946). Discretionary application of the
recrimination doctrine is discussed more fully in pt. V (A) infra.
14. Delaware, New York and Pennsylvania. Although Pennsylvania
limits the defense of recrimination to the situation where both parties are
guilty of adultery, Ditria v. Ditroia, 202 Pa. Super. 7, 193 A.2d 877
(1963), the statute which lists the grounds for divorce in Pennsylvania
provides that eligibility for divorce (whatever the ground relied upon) is
limited to "the innocent and injured spouse." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
10 (1955). The enactment of this statutory restriction clearly amounts to
the adoption of a doctrine very similar to that of recrimination.
15. For example, recrimination has been successfully pleaded: (a) in
Alabama where defendant was guilty of abandonment and plaintiff of
adultery, Lyall v. Lyall, 250 Ala. 635, 35 So. 2d 550 (1948); (b) in
Florida, Illinois, Minnesota and Texas where both parties were guilty of
cruelty, Carlson v. Carlson, 144 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1962); Elston v. Elston,
344 Ill. App. 233, 100 N.E.2d 635 (1951); Jokela v. Jokela, 111 Minn. 403,
127 N.W. 391 (1910); Beck v. Beck, 63 Tex. 34 (1885); (c) in New
Jersey where defendant had committed adultery and plaintiff statutory
desertion, Arnaboldi v. Arnaboldi, 101 N.J. Eq. 126, 138 A. 116 (1927);
and (d) in Oregon where defendant was guilty of desertion and plaintiff
of adultery, Earle v. Earle, 43 Ore. 293, 72 P. 976 (1903).
16. To construe a statute in this manner is to ignore a well-recognized
canon of statutory construction, namely, "Expressio unius est ezolusio
awterius," which means that the express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another. 2 J. SuTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
TRUCTiON § 4915 (1943).
17. 64 N.J. Super. 29, 165 A.2d 305 (1960).
1968]
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doctrine is statutory insofar as adultery stands in
bar of a charge of adultery. However, the statute is
not exclusive; it does not nullify the unwritten law.
... [T]he recrimination doctrine is firmly embedded
as part of our statutory and unwritten law.'8
(2) A person applying for a divorce on any ground must
be refused relief if it is revealed that he has committed the
same offense of which he complains. Five states have statutes
providing for the imposition of this rule.19 The enactments
of Arkansas and Wyoming are representative:
If it shall appear to the court that.., both parties
have been guilty of the adultery, or such other of-
fense or injury complained of in the bill, then no
divorce shall be granted or decreed.20
No divorce shall be decreed in any case where it
shall appear that.., the party complaining shall be
guilty of the same crime or misconduct charged
against the defendant. 2'
Of the five jurisdictions with this kind of enactment,
Wyoming is the only one which in practice restricts recrim-
ination to the case where both spouses have committed the
same transgression. 22
(3) A divorce petitioner must be "the party not at fault"
or "the innocent party" or the "non-wrongdoer." The enact-
ments of Kentucky, New Hampshire and Wisconsin are il-
lustrative of those operative in the seven jurisdictions23 fol-
lowing this statutory approach:
18. Id. at 308 (citations omitted). The wife's recrimination was un-
successful, since she was unable to establish that plaintiff was guilty of
desertion.
19. AR. STAT. ANN. § 34-1209 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
1528 (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 30-109 (1961) ; McCH. STAT. ANN. § 25.90
(1957); WYO. STAT. § 20-55 (1959).
20. Anx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1209 (1947).
21. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-55 (1959).
22. In the following cases recrimination has been applied in bar of a
divorce even though the parties did not commit the same transgression:
Evans v. Evans, 219 Ark. 325, 241 S.W.2d 713 (1951) (defendant guilty
of gross indignities and plaintiff of adultery); Rowel v. Rowell, 209 Ga.
572, 74 S.E.2d 833 (1953) (defendant guilty of stautory cruelty and
plaintiff adultery); Melinn v. Melinn, 329 Mich. 96, 44 N.W.2d 886 (1950)
(defendant guilty of cruelty and plaintiff of adultery); Wilson v. Wilson,
89 Neb. 749, 132 N.W. 401 (1911) (defendant guilty of adultery and
plaintiff statutory cruelty).
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961); Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 403.020
(1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. §3 452.010, -.090 (1952); N.H. REV. STAT. § 458.7
1955) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10
1955); Wis. STAT. § 247.101 (1955).
[Vol 20
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A divorce may be granted to the party not in fault
for the following causes :24
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be
decreed in favor of the innocent party for either of
the following causes :25
The equitable doctrine that the court shall not aid
a wrongdoer is applicable to any party suing for a
divorce ... except that where it appears from the
evidence that both parties have been guilty of mis-
conduct sufficiently grave to constitute cause for
divorce, the court may in its discretion grant a judg-
ment of legal separation to the parties whose equities
on the whole are found to be superior.
2 6
(4) The court must deny relief to any divorce applicant
who is shown to be guilty of misconduct constituting any
recognized ground for divorce. Although but four jurisdic-
tions have statutes expressly providing for this form of
recrimination-which represents the broadest concept of the
doctrine-over half the states actually belong in this class.
2 7
The District of Columbia statute requires that the petitioner be an "in-
nocent spouse" only in the case where the parties have lived apart for two
years or more, pursuant to a decree of legal separation, and petitioner now
seeks to have the decree enlarged into a judgment of absolute divorce.
Section 7 of the Divorce Law of the Virgin Islands (Bill No. 14) (1944)
restricts the right to a divorce to "the injured party," but this phrase has
been construed as requiring merely a showing that the petitioner has been
wronged, not a showing that the petitioner himself is guiltiess. Burch v.
Burch, 195 F.2d (3d Cir. 1952).
Nelson states that statutes restricting divorce eligibility to the innocent
spouse impose a rule distinct from the recrimination doctrine. 1 W. NEr.
SoN, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNDLMENT, § 10.02 (1945). This may be
true in an abstract sense, but these enactments seem sufficiently akin to
recrimination in spirit and purpose to warrant regarding them as a type
of recrimination legislation. 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 231
(1966).
24. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.020 (2) (1963) (emphasis added). The
Kentucky act separately provides in subsection 3 of this same section for
application of recrimination in the situation where an habitually intoxi-
cated spouse applies for a divorce on the ground of his mate's habitual
drunkeness (of at least one year's duration).
25. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.7 (1955) (emphasis added).
26. Wis. STAT. § 247.101 (1955).
27ZA. JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, supra note 1 at 448. Included in this group
ai-seven jurisdictions whose codes make no reference to recrimination.
Arnold v. Arnold, 257 Iowa 429, 133 N.W.2d 53 (1965) ; Nichols v. Nichols,
257 Iowa 458, 133 N.W.2d 77 (1965); Sackman v. Sackman, 203 A.2d 903
(Md. 1964); Saltzgaver v. Saltzgaver, 182 Md. 624, 35 A.2d 810 (1944);
Reddington v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 59 N.E.2d 775 (1945); Benedict
v. Benedict, 17 Ohio Supp. 92 (1946); Opperman v. Opperman, 77 Ohio
App. 69, 65 N.E.2d 655 (1945); Pakuris v. Pakuris, 95 R.I. 305, 186
A.2d 719 (1962); Thomas v. Thomas, 83 R.I. 251, 115 A.2d 526 (1955);
Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731 (1950) (semble); Walker
7
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The California enactment typifies those of the few jurisdic-
tions2s having this kind of statute:
Divorces must be denied upon showing:
(4) Recrimination.
Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any
cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the
plaintiff's cause of divorce.29
Surprisingly enough, of the four states having this type
of enactment, only one--South Dakota-actually applies re-
crimination in the mechanical manner prescribed by the stat-
ute. The other three-California, Idaho and Montana-treat
recrimination as a discretionary doctrine to be used or dis-
regarded by the court as it deems best in the case before
it.80
(5) The court must deny a divorce to a petitioner relying
on the ground of adultery if it appears that the petitioner is
guilty of any cause for divorce. Hawaii is the only state with
this type of statute. Provides the Hawaii enactment:
No divorce for the cause of adultery be granted:
(d) Where there is reasonable cause to believe
that the libellant has been guilty of any act which
would entitle the defendant, if innocent, to a divorce.
The fourth ground [ground (d)] for refusing a de-
cree above mentioned shall not be applied to an ap-
plication for a divorce for any other cause than that
of adultery . . . .s"
v. Walker, 92 Vt. 443, 104 A. 828 (1918). A possible eighth jurisdiction is
Connecticut. Detroit News, Jan. 7, 1965, at 6A, col. 2-3.
Also included in this group are a number of jurisdictions with statutes
that appear to restrict the application of recrimination to the case where
both spouses are guilty of adultery (see note 15 supra) and a few states
with statutes that seem to limit application of the doctrine to the situation
where the plaintiff has committed the same transgression of which he com-
plains (see note 22 spra).
28. CAL. CIrV. CODE §§ 111, 122 (West 1954); IDAHO CODE ANN.. .
82-611, -613 (1958) ; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21-118, -128 (1961) ; SD.
CODE §§ 14.0713, -.0718 (1939).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 111, 122 (West 1954).
30. The discretionary-use-of-recrimination approach is discussed in pt.
V(A) infra.
81. HAwAII REv. LAws § 824-26 (1961).
692 [Vol. 20
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(6) Adultery-and no other transgression--is a recrimina-
tory defense against all other divorce grounds. The statute
of West Virginia, the one jurisdiction with this kind of enact-
ment, declares:
[A] divorce [shall not] be granted for any cause when
it appears that ... the plaintiff has, within three
years before the institution of the suit, been guilty
of adultery not condoned. 2
Notwithstanding the restrictive language of the statute, it
appears that recrimination can operate in West Virginia even
though plaintiff is not guilty of adultery. Since divorce cases
are tried in a court of equity in West Virginia, 83 the court has
the authority to invoke recognized canons of equity in ap-
propriate fact situations. Among these canons is the following
maxim: "He who seeks the aid of a court of equity must enter
the court with clean hands.13 4 Relying on this equity principle,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals invoked re-
crimination in bar of relief in Wolfe v. Wolfe,8 3 where the
divorce applicant (wife) was found to be guilty of cruelty
but not of adultery. Said the court: "A party in a suit for
divorce, as in all other equity cases, must come with hands
unsoiled and clean. Before relief can be obtained, a complain-
ing party's own conduct must be beyond substantial re-
proach."8 6
(7) A divorce applicant who is himself guilty of a marital
offense may be denied (or granted) a divorce in the court's
discretion. Seven American jurisdictions have adopted this
position by judicial decision,87 and three have done so by
statute.8
England's Matrimonial Causes Act, discussed later in this
paper,89 also gives the court discretion to award or deny a
32. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-14 (1966).
83. "The circuit court, on the chancery side thereof, shall have jurisdic-
tion ... for divorces." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-6 (1966).
34. H. McCIN0ToO, HANDBOO OF THE PR NciPLES OF EQUITY § 26 (2d
ed. 1948).
35. 120 W. Va. 389, 198 S.E. 209 (1938).
36. Id., 198 S.E. at 215.
37. Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952); Vanderhuff v. Van-
derhuff, 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Matlow v. Matlow, 89 Ariz. 293,
361 P.2d 648 (1961) ; De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598
(1952); Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fa. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946); Howay v.
Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953) ; Burns v. Burns, 145 Mont. 1,
400 P.2d 642 (1965).
38. KA=. STAT. ANN. § 60-1606 (1964); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518.08
(1947), § 518.06 (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2735.5 (Supp. 1966).
39. Pt. V (A) infra.
1968]
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divorce in cases where the complainant is shown to be guilty
of recriminatory misconduct. 40
(8) A petitioner is entitled to a divorce even though him-
self guilty of conduct constituting grounds for divorce, if his
misdeeds are less reprehensible than those of his spouse. Un-
der this rule, known as the doctrine of comparative rectitude,
a divorce is denied only when the parties appear equally to
blame.41 States Nelson:
Some courts have taken the position that... power
or discretion exists to weigh the relative faults of the
parties and to grant a divorce to the one less at
fault, notwithstanding the other has also been guilty
of conduct which is a ground for divorce.
42
Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Utah have adopted this
doctrine by court decision. 48
(9) The recrimination principle has application except when
the plaintiff bases his suit on a non-culpatory ground, such
as voluntary separation or incompatibility. Five states pro-
vide by statute that recrimination has no application in a
divorce action based on voluntary separation 44 and seven
jurisdictions have so determined by judicial decision.45 Courts
in two jurisdictions have ruled that in a suit grounded on
40. Matrimonial Causes Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 25, § 4 (1950).
41. "Where the court finds that the parties are equally at fault it will
refuse to grant relief to either party." 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separa-
tion § 228 (1966). See also Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409
(1952).
42. 1 W. NELsoN, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 10.03 (1945).
48. Ayers v. Ayers, 226 Ark. 394, 290 S.W.2d 24 (1956); Longinotti v.
Longinotti, 169 Ark. 1001, 277 S.W. 41 (1925); Smith v. Smith 139 So.
2d 818 (La 1962) ; Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952 ; Watts
v. Watts, 390 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1964); Marr v. Marr, 191 S.W.2d 512
(Tex. 1945); Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956);
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953).
44. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1) (1964), construed in Fuqua v. Fuqua,
268 Ala. 127, 104 So. 2d 925 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202(7)
(1947), construed in Young v. Young, 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944) ;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.020 (1963), construed in Ward v. Ward, 213
Ky. 606, 281 S.W.801 (1926); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1967); WIS.
STAT. § 247.101 (Supp. 1967).
45. Unger v. Unger, 174 A.2d 84 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1961); Finnegan v.
Finnegan, 76 Idaho 500, 285 P.2d 488 (1955); Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 76 Idaho
95, 278 P.2d 200 (1954); Raymond v. Carrano, 112 La. 869, 36 So. 787
(1904) ; Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960) ; Matysek v.
Matyseic, 212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1957); Edmisten v. Edmisten, 265
N.C. 488, 144 S.E.2d 404 (1965) ; Jones v. Jones, 261 N.C. 612, 135 S.E.2d
554 (1964); Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R.I. 230, 106 A. 801 (1919); Fields v.
Fields, 399 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. 1966); Hefer v. Helfer, 342 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.
1960).
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incompatibility the court may invoke or ignore the recrimina-
tion doctrine as it deems best.46
In summary, thirty-four jurisdictions have legislation pro-
viding for application of recrimination in some form,47 eleven
have adopted some concept of the doctrine by court decision,
48
and five have abolished recrimination altogether.49 Signifi-
cantly, over half the states recognize the broadest concept of
the doctrine-the rule requiring the court to deny the 'peti-
tion of an applicant shown to be guilty of misconduct con-
stituting any ground for divorce.
III. LEGALISTIC REASONS ADVANCED IN JUSTIFICATION
OF RECRIMINATION
One may reasonably inquire why the recrimination doc-
trine has been so well received in this country. The courts
have defended the doctrine with at least eight different argu-
ments. Four of these arguments-which may be termed "le-
galistic"--are the following: (a) The doctrine has many
centuries of judicial acceptance to bear witness to its sound-
ness.50 (b) An applicant for a divorce must come into court
with clean hands. (c) When the parties are in par delicto
(equal fault) the court should aid neither. (d) Marriage is
a contract, and the plaintiff, having himself breached the
contract, has no standing to demand relief. An examination
of these theories will disclose that one of them constitutes a
meritorious defense of recrimination.
A. Historical Acceptance
Recrimination undeniably has acquired historical respect-
ability. Declares one writer: "The obvious argument in sup-
46. Shearer v. Shearer, 356 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965); Burch v. Burch,
195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952); Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147
(1950); Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
47. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Colum-
bia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, kew Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming have such legislation.
48. Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont have adopted recrimination by
court decision. South Carolina's position on the doctrine is not clear. See
Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731 (1950).
49. Colorado, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Washington have
enacted such statutes. For citations to these statutes see note 10 supra.
50. See Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249 (1858); Courson v. Courson,
208 Md. 171, 117 A.2d 850 (1955).
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port of the rule is its vitality for over two thousand years;
one comes to think of it as something inevitably funda-
mental.,
5 '
But though recrimination has ancient origins, its form and
effects in the law of past societies were quite different from
their modern counterparts. Thus the doctrine operated in the
Mosaic law, but only under the following narrowly defined
circumstances:
If any man take a wife and go in unto her and
hate her, and give occasions of speech against her,
and bring up an evil name upon her, and say, I took
this woman, and when I came to her I found her not
a maid . . . [and this accusation is proven to be
untrue] the elders of that city shall take that man
and chastise him; and they shall amerce him in an
hundred shekels of silver, and give them unto the
father of the damsel, because he hath brought up
an evil name upon a virgin of Israel; and she shall
be his wife; he may not put her away all his days
[regardless of how she subsequently behaves].
52
During the first century A.D. the recrimination principle
found its way into the Roman law, but it manifested itself
there only in a highly specialized form, namely in the doctrine
compensatio criminalis.5 8 Application of this doctrine did not
bar either spouse from obtaining a divorce; a Roman hus-
band or wife could legally discard his or her mate without
resorting to the courts.5 4 The effects of the compensatio
criminalis rule were purely economic in character. The doc-
trine developed in the following manner: A statute enacted
in 9 A.D. (during the reign of Augustus) enabled a Roman
divorcee whose husband had discarded her without good
cause to recover her dowry within one year after the di-
vorce. The specific remedy provided was the actio rei uxoriae.
If she instituted such an action, her ex-husband could reduce
51. Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REv. 377,
379 (1967).
52. 22 Deuteronomy 18:19.
53. Beamer The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10
KA. Crff L. %W'. 213 (1942); Comment, A Comparison of Recrimination
and the Doctrine of Comparative Rectitude and Their Incidents, 3 BAYLOR
L. REV. 55 (1950).
54. See Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. 504
(1790). See also Sherman, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Massachu-
eotts, 83 B.U.L. REv. 454 (1953).
[Vol. 20
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his liability (that is, retain part of the dowry) by showing
that she was guilty of adultery or some other marital offense.
By establishing adultery he could keep 1/6 of the dowry,
and by proving some other misconduct he could retain 1/8. 5
On the other hand, if the husband was guilty of adultery
and the wife was innocent of any improper behavior, then
the latter could demand immediate restitution of her dowry;
similarly, if the husband was guilty of some lesser marital
infraction (and the wife's hands were clean), then the wife
could compel return of her dowry within six months.58 In-
evitably, cases arose in which both spouses were at fault,
and the statute made no provision for this exigency. When
faced with this situation the Roman courts decided that the
parties' offenses compensated for (cancelled out) one another
and that neither spouse should be penalized. 57 Quoting Pa-
pinian's comment on the case of Titius and Maevia:
Since husband and wife accuse the other, it has
been found that both of them have given cause for
repudiation. This ought to be accepted thus: namely,
that neither should be punished by that law which
both have broken. For equal faults mutually com-
pensate each other.58
Applying this principle, the courts permitted the wife to
recover her entire dowry (instead of allowing the husband to
retain 1/6 or 1/8 of it), but granted the husband a full
year to make restitution (instead of ordering him to per-
form immediately or within six months). 59 This was the
extent to which recrimination operated in the Roman law.
Application of the principle merely affected the manner in
which the parties' property was divided between them.
In the twelfth century the recrimination concept was
adopted from the Roman law by canonists, who incorporated
it in an addition to Corpus Juris Canonici. 60 An entire sec-
tion of this work, known as the Connubia, was devoted to
devices calculated to protect a wife (and in some instances,
55. R. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL EXPOSITIo OF R0
LAW 691 (1903).
56. Beamer, supra note 53, at 218.
57. Note, Divorce-Remimination as a Defense, 29 M cr. L. REv. 232
(1930).
58. DIGEST 24.3.39.
59. Beamer, supra note 53, at 218-19.
60. Beamer, supra note 53, at 220.
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the children) from being cast loose in a society in which
unattached women had no place."1 One of the protections
given the wife was the rule that a wife accused of adultery
in a proceeding for a divorce a mensa et thoro (legal separa-
tion) could defeat her mate's suit by showing that the latter
had also committed adultery.
02
If one having denied conjugal obligations to his
wife apprehended in adultery, if he commits adultery
with another, ought it to be brought about that he
should continue to regard his wife with marital af-
fection? To the above we reply, where equal delicts
mutually compensate for each other, the man guilty
of such fornication cannot refuse the consortium of
his wife. 3
Since the Catholic Church did not recognize a divorce a
'vincuto matrimonii (absolute divorce) under any circum-
stances, 4 the canon law application of recrimination did not
have the effect of preventing otherwise eligible parties from
marrying again. Use of the doctrine could merely determine
the outcome of a legal separation proceeding.6 5
In England ecclesiastical courts, applying the canon law,
exercised jurisdiction over matrimonial actions from the reign
of William the Conqueror until 1857, when the Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1857 was passed.66 During most of this period
recrimination played the same limited role in English mar-
riage law that it did in the law of other Catholic nations.
67
However, during the years between the English Reformation
(beginning about 1525) and the turn of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the effect of the doctrine's application was to prevent
the spouses from contracting another marriage. This is ex-
plained by the fact that even though the English ecclesiastical
courts pronounced their judgments in the form of divorces
61. Beamer, supra note 53, at 221.
62. J. MADDEN, HANDBOOK o THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 92 (1931); Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249 (1858) (dictum).
63. Extra, 1.5 t. 16, c.7.
64. Note, Divorce-Recrimination-Uncean Hands, 13 ORE. L. REV.
335, 339 (1934).
65. 2 J. BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION § 166 (1891).
66. 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNicA Divorce 516, Ecclesiastical Law 891
(1964). During the brief period of Oliver Cromwell's Protectorate divorce
jurisdiction did not lie in the ecclesiastical courts. Id.
67. 2 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
§§ 84-85 (4th ed. 1864).
[Vol. 20
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a mensa et thoro, the populace nevertheless treated these
judgments as licenses to remarry, and the authorities tolerated
this practice. 68 However, in the 1602 divorce case of Rye V.
Folambe,69 the Star Chamber decided-and emphasized-
that the only kind of divorce possible in England was a di-
vorce a mensa et thoro. Following this decision the indissolu-
bility of marriage could no longer be doubted. Thus from
1602 until 1857, when the Matrimonial Causes Act of 185770
provided grounds for absolute divorce, application of the re-
crimination doctrine merely prevented the complainant from
obtaining a legal separation. Since the procurement of a sepa-
ration decree did not enable the petitioner to remarry, usually
a spouse's motive for seeking such a decree was to obtain
a favorable determination of his support obligations (or
rights). Consequently, the ecclesiastical court's invocation of
recrimination to deny the applicant a legal separation was a
matter of real importance to the applicant only insofar as the
ruling affected his property rights or obligations. 1 Thus the
English canonical courts' use of recrimination after 1602 can
validly be equated to the Roman courts' use of the doctrine
compensatio criminalis.
Three English ecclesiastical cases, Forster v. Forster,
72
Beeby .Beeby,78 and Proctor v. Proctor4 are mainly respon-
sible for the introduction of recrimination into modern Anglo-
68. 'But in whatever form their [the ecclesiastical courts'] decrees were
pronounced; the community, with the apparent approval of the Church
and State, relied upon them as justifying a second marriage." Beamer,
supra note 53.
"There is some evidence that during the last half of the sixteenth cen-
tury the law and practice was that a divorce for adultery in the ecclesiasti-
cal court would so far dissolve the marital relation that the parties might
marry other persons." J. MADDEN, supra note 62, § 81.
"The Ecclesiastical Courts ... had no power to pronounce a divorce a
viniculo if there had been a valid marriage. For a short time after the
Reformation the Ecclesiastical Courts seem to have considered that they
had this power." W. HoLUSWORTr, The Ecclesiastical Courts and Their
Jurisdiction, in 2 SELECT EssAYs iN ANL0-AIERIcAN LEGAL HisToRY 255,
299 (1908).
69. 1 Moo. K.B. 682 (1602).
70. Matrimonial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
71. If the suit was brought by the husband, usually his primary
purpose was to relieve himself of the common law duty of
support. If a recriminatory defense was set up by the wife,
her sole purpose was to prevent the loss of that support. It
may be seen that the charge and counter charge were based
on property considerations.
SHERMAN, supra note 54, at 462.
72. 1 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. 504 (1790).
73. 1 Hag. Eec. 789, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (1799).
74. 2 Hag. Con. 292, 161 Eng. Rep. 747 (1819).
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American law.75 All three cases were decided by the same
judge, Sir William Scott (who later became Lord Stowell).
The Forster case was a divorce action (a mensa et thoro)
brought by a husband on the ground of his wife's adultery.
The latter's principal defense was a plea of "justification,"
grounded on the allegation that plaintiff was guilty of adul-
tery. After concluding that there was sufficient evidence
to support defendant's charge of adultery against plaintiff,
the court ruled that the doctrine of recrimination was appli-
cable and that it operated to bar plaintiff from relief. Quoting
from the opinion:
Something has been said as if this [recrimination]
ought not to be the law: with that question I have
nothing to do; for I must take the law as it is, and
I shall therefore content myself upon that matter
with observing that it appears a good moral and
social doctrine, which I have not the inclination, if
I had the power, to innovate. It is unquestionably
the rule of this Court.7 6
The facts in the Beeby case were similar to those in the
Forster controversy. To the husband's action for a legal sepa-
ration on the ground of his spouse's adultery the wife pleaded
in bar that petitioner was likewise guilty of adultery. The
court, after deciding that both spouses were guilty of the
misconduct charged against them, ruled that plaintiff was
debarred from relief by operation of the recrimination doc-
trine. Stated Sir William Scott:
The doctrine, that this [recriminatory offense] if
proved is a valid plea in bar, has its foundation in
reason and propriety: it would be hard if a man
could complain of the breach of a contract which he
has violated; if he could complain of an injury when
he is open to a charge of the same nature. It is not
unfit if he, who is the guardian of the purity of his
own house, has converted it into a brothel, that he
should not be allowed to complain of the pollution
which he himself has introduced; if he, who has first
75. "[Ilt is due to a series of cases beginning in 1790 with Forster v.
Forster, and all decided by Lord Stowell, that the doctrine of recrimination
really secured a firm foothold in the judicial legislation of modern times."
Bcamer supra note 53, at 226.
76. 1 Hag. Con. at 146-47, 161 Eng. Rep. at 505.
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violated his marriage vow, should be barred of his
remedy.7
7
In the Proctor case, another suit in which the husband
sought a divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of his wife's
adultery, plaintiff admitted the truth of defendant's counter-
charge that subsequent to her trangression plaintiff had also
committed adultery. The court ruled that plaintiff, having
committed a recriminatory offense, was not entitled to a legal
separation. Quoting from the opinion:
It was a doctrine not peculiar to the canon law
that it looked with disfavour to a complaining party
who was himself an offender in the same way; for
the civil law, certainly, did the same, to the extent
of not barring the wife's demand of dower against
such a husband .... Certain it is that the general
maxim of compensation, as applied to mutual moral
failings, was forged in that [civil law] mint.78
Whether the inconveniences of the rule, as it now
operates (considered as they ought to be in opposi-
tion to those which might follow the reversal of it),
are such as nevertheless ought to produce a reversal,
is a question into which this Court has neither a right
nor a duty to inquire.7 9
Although an absolute divorce was not procurable in any
English Court between 1602 and 1857, it was possible (al-
though expensive and difficult) to obtain such relief from
Parliament.80 During this period there were at least four
parliamentary divorce cases in which the respondent at-
tempted to recriminate: Duke of Norfolk's Case,81 Major
Campbell's Case, 2 Major Bland's Case,88 and Simmons'
Case. 4 It is obvious from the disposition of these cases that
the House of Lords did not feel constrained to pay homage
to the recrimination doctrine. In two of the cases the Lords
simply ignored the doctrine (except when adjudicating the
spouses' property rights), and in the other two they applied
77. 1 Hag. Ece. at 790, 162 Eng. Rep. at 756.
78. 2 Hag. Con. at 297-98, 161 Eng. Rep. at 749.
79. Id. at 302, 161 Eng. Rep. at 751.
80. J. MADDEN, supra note 62, at 881.
81. L.R. 15 H.L. 20a (1700).
82. L.R. 42 H.L. 141 (1799).
83. L.R. 46 H.L. 435 (1808).
84. L.R. 77 H.L. 410 (1845).
1968]
17
Moore: Recrimination: An Examination of the Recrimination Doctrine
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the principle in a clearly unorthodox manner. In the Duke of
Norfolk's Case the Lords granted the petitioner (husband) a
divorce (on the ground that the Duchess had committed adul-
tery with Sir John Germaine) even though there was no
serious doubt that the Duke was himself guilty of adultery.
The House appeared to regard petitioner's misconduct as ir-
relevant to the issue of whether he should be granted a di-
vorce"8 (although relevant to the question of how the property
should be divided) .6 In Major Campbell's Case the House
passed a bill granting the applicant (Major Campbell) a
divorce after refusing even to listen to evidence tending to
show that the Major was guilty of marital misbehavior.8 7
The House denied relief to the petitioners in the Bland and
Simmons' cases, but though the applicant in each case was
undeniably guilty of recriminatory misconduct, in neither in-
stance does it appear that the recrimination principle deter-
mined the outcome of the case. Major Bland's offense (adul-
tery) was committed twelve years before he sought to divorce
his adulterous wife and was definitely condoned by the lat-
ter.s8 It therefore seems likely that the Lords merely used
petitioner's marital infraction as a pretext for denying a
divorce petition that they believed, for other reasons, should
not be granted. In Simmons' Case complainant was accused
of illicit relations with one Ann Keeling. However, the
House, speaking through Lord Campbell, indicated that it
was denying complainant's divorce petition primarily because
defendant's clearly-proven prostitution appeared largely at-
tributable to her husband's wilful failure to support her. 9
85. See 2 L. HowARD, A HISTORY OF MATRImoNIAL INSTITUTIONS 106
(1904).
86. A special clause was inserted into the divorce bill ordering the Duke
pay the Duchess all monies brought by her into the marriage ( . 10,000).
87. "Mr. Adam [respondent's attorney] offered recriminatory matter,
and tendered in evidence a letter of the petitioner to Mrs. Campbell, writ-
ten before the commencement of her misconduct; but this letter was re-
jected by the House and the bill passed." T. MAcQuEEN, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF TnE HOUSE OF LORDS 590 (1842).
88. Normally a defense of recrimination cannot be based on an offense
which the defendant has condoned. See e.g., Kiekamp v. Klekamp, 275
Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916) ; Neblett v. keblet, 274 Wis. 574, 81 N.W.2d
61 (1957). See also 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 232 (1966).
89. Willful failure to support was not a recognized ground for a divorce
a mensma et thoro in the English ecclesiastical courts. J. MADDEN, supra;
note 62, § 81. It therefore seems improbable that the Lords intended to
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With the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 185790
the divorce jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was trans-
ferred to the newly-created Court for Divorce and Matri-
monial Causes (commonly referred to simply as the Divorce
Court), which was empowered to grant an absolute divorce
in specified situations.
This enactment introduced recrimination into the statutory
law of England, but it did not compel the Divorce Court to
apply the doctrine in any given case. Quoting from the Act:
The Court shall not be bound to pronounce such
Decree [of divorce] if it shall find that the Petitioner
has during the Marriage been guilty of Adultery, or
if the Petitioner shall, in the opinion of the Court,
have been guilty of . . . cruelty toward the other
Party to the Marriage, or of having separated him-
self or herself from the other Party before the
Adultery complained of, and without reasonable ex-
cuse or of such wilful Neglect or Misconduct as
has conduced to the Adultery.91
Under the present English law the Probate, Divorce, and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, which now
has jurisdiction over matrimonial causes, 92 retains discretion
over when to apply recrimination.9
Ecclesiastical courts were never established in America.94
In Colonial times the few divorce cases that arose were
adjudicated by the local legislature or governor. 95 Other mat-
rimonial actions were handled by courts of equity under
their general equity powers.96 Later the various legislatures
conferred specific marriage and divorce jurisdiction on the
common law or equity courts, and the question then arose
whether such enactments should be regarded as original pro-
90. 20 & 21 Viet., c. 85.
91. 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, § XXXI.
92. 12 HALSBURY, THE LAws op ENGLAND 213 (3d ed. 1955).
93. Tihe court shall not be bound to pronounce a decree of divorce
and may dismiss the petition if it finds that the petitioner has,
during the marriage, been guilty of adultery or if, in the opin-
ion of the court, the petitioner has been guilty . . . (ii) of
cruelty... or (iii) -where the ground of the petition is adultery
or cruelty, of having without reasonable excuse deserted ....
Matrimonial Causes Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 25, § 4 (1950).
94. 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 65, §§ 117, 120. See also Cotter v. Cotter,
225 F. 471 (C.C.A. Alaska 1915).
95. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); A. JACOBS & J. GOEBE,
supra note 1, at 338-39.
96. Beamer, supra note 53, at 241; see, e.g., Bray v. Landergren, 161
Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252 (1934).
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visions or as vessels carrying the whole slumbering body of
the ecclesiastical law which had been placed in suspension
for want of a court to administer it. The New York courts
adopted the "original provision" theory,97 and those of Con-
necticut and Massachusetts adopted a modification of this
interpretation, 98 but the majority of courts accepted the abey-
ance rule.90 Surprisingly enough, however, the particular
theory adopted by a given state seems to have had no bear-
ing on the state's treatment of the recrimination doctrine,
for all of the early American cases which considered the
question accepted some form of recrimination.100 It is ob-
vious that the courts in those jurisdictions embracing the
"original provision" theory were in no way constrained to
accept recrimination. And even in those states adopting the
"suspension" (or "abeyance") theory the courts could rea-
sonably have rejected use of recrimination in divorce (as
distinguished from separation) cases with the following ar-
gument: If canonical doctrines are to be applied in American
courts, their application should be limited to fact situations
paralleling those faced by the ecclesiastical courts. And an
American couple seeking an absolute divorce presents a fact
situation distinctly different from that presented by an Eng-
lish couple seeking a divorce a mensa et thoro. Whatever the
merit of this argument, it had no perceptible influence on
the American courts, and recrimination, in its mandatory
form, became firmly entrenched in American divorce law by
97. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72 (1908).
98. Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189 (1845); Robbins v. Robbins, 140 Mass.
528 (1886).
99. See Note, Recrimination and Alimony-Are They, CompAable?, 13
SYRACu E L. REv. 562, 563 (1962) which states:
[T]he implementation of these statutes created serious prob-
lems of construction. Were they to be treated as original pro-
visions, without regard to prior English law, or had the English
law merely been in abeyance and now impliedly incorporated
in the newly granted jurisdiction? The majority of the states
seem to have adopted the so called "abeyance theory," con-
struing their statutes in light of the applicable English law.
New York, however, seems to have adopted the "original pro-
vision" theory.
100. Ribet v. Ribet, 39 Ala. 348 (1864); Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 249
(1858) ; Johns v. Johns, 29 Ga. 718 (1860) ; Gordon v. Gordon 41 Ill. App.
137 (1891); Trowbridge v. Carlin, 12 La. Ann. 882 (18575; Handy v.
Handy, 124 Mass. 394 (1878); Hall v. Hall, 4 Allen 39 (Mass. 1862);
Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563 (1877); Nagel v. Nagel, 12 Mo.
53 (1848) ; Fuller v. Fuller, 41 N.J. Eq. 198, 3 A. 409 (1886) ; Wood v.
Wood, 2 Paige 108 (N.Y. Ch. 1830); Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 90 (1Sf);
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the mid-nineteenth century.1 1 The doctrine acquired an even
firmer base as many of the states, over a period of years,
enacted statutes providing for its application under specified
circumstances. 02
In summary, the recrimination principle existed in the
Mosaic law in a highly restricted form, operating only to bar
a divorce to a husband who had falsely accused his wife of
unchastity. Recrimination later manifested itself in the
Roman law, but there the doctrine's sole function was to aid
the court in determining how to divide up the parties' prop-
erty. In the canon law the doctrine operated merely to bar
an adulterous spouse from obtaining a legal separation (di-
vorce a mensa et thoro). The doctrine played the same limited
role in English matrimonial law (which followed the canon
law and depended upon ecclesiastical courts for pronounce-
ment), except during the brief period from the beginning of
the Reformation until the start of the seventeenth century.
The principle's application occasionally prevented a petitioner
from obtaining an absolute divorce through a Parliamentary
proceeding, but Parliament treated recrimination as merely
a discretionary bar; and in any event, Parliamentary divorces
were so expensive and difficult to procure that they were
never common.' 03 The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 (and
its successor enactments) provided for application of recrim-
ination, but only in the court's discretion. In the United
States, ecclesiastical courts were never established, and divorce
jurisdiction was therefore lodged in the common law and
equity courts. For reasons that are not apparent, most of
these courts broadened the scope and intensified the effect
of the recrimination doctrine by recognizing additional re-
criminatory offenses (along with adultery) and by applying
the principle in bar of an absolute divorce. 0 4 In addition,
101. Cases cited note 100 supra.
102. See Freed, Defenses Against Divorce in French and Anerican
Law, 38 TEX. L. REV. 303, 309 (1960).
103. "The expense and delay which were involved in the necessary
preliminary steps [to a Parliamentary divorce], and in securing the pas-
sage of the act, were so great that no such divorce could be obtained
except by the wealthy." 12 HALSBURY, THE LAws OF ENGLAND 214 (3d ed.
1955).
During the period between 1700 and 1857, when Parliamentary divorces
were most common, only 230 marriages were terminated in this manner. Id.
104. It is, of course, apparent why the courts did this in those states
which enacted statutes requiring them to do so-that is, statutes which
require the court to invoke recrimination in divorce suits (where appro-
priate) and which declare that the defendant can recriminate by showing
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most American courts considered use of the doctrine to be
mandatory and did not elect to alter this position in 1857
or thereafter. It is clear from the foregoing that one cannot
tenably defend on a historical basis the doctrine of recrim-
ination as it now operates in most American jurisdictions.
B. The Clean Hands Rule
The equity maxim that he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands is the oldest reason advanced in justi-
fication of recrimination,10 5 being traceable back at least as
far as the 1799 English case of Beeby v. Beeby.108 Modern
courts appear to use this maxim more often than any other
rationale to support the doctrine;107 illustrative cases are
Hoff v. Hoff,O8 and Carlson v. Carlson.10 9 In both cases the
husband sued for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, and the
wife counterclaimed for a divorce on the same ground. In
both instances the parties were denied relief on appeal. In
the former case the Michigan Supreme Court declared:
A proper administration of justice does not require
that courts shall occupy their time and the time
of the people who are... witnesses to the misdoings
of others in giving equitable relief to parties who
have no equities. And it is as true of divorce cases
as of any others that a party must come into a court
of equity with clean hands. 110
In the Carlson case the Florida District Court of Appeal
said:
Recrimination is an outgrowth of the equity maxim
that he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands .... "One spouse cannot be the aggressor in
a domestic fracas, that is to say, harass, torment
and humiliate the other until she . . . retaliates in
kind and then claim a divorce .... When this is found
that plaintiff is guilty of any transgression recognized as a ground for
divorce.
105. 2 C. VRf~mn, AMERICAN FAIY LAws § 78 (1932).
106. 1 Hag. Ecc. '189, 162 Eng. Rep. 755 (1799).
107. Note, Recrimination and Alimony-Ae They Compatible?, 13 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 562, 565 (1962) ; Note, Recrimination as a Defense in Divorce
Actions, 28 IowA L. REV. 341, 343 (1943).
108. 48 Mich. 281, 12 N.W. 160 (1882).
109. 144 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1962).
110. Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N.W. 160 (1882).
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RECRIMINATION
to be the case equity will keep hands off and leave
them to their own devices."'
111
Perhaps the most colorful statement of the clean hands
precept to be found in a divorce case is that of the Mississippi
Supreme Court in Oberlin v. Oberlin,1 2 where the evidence
revealed that the defendant (wife) was guilty of desertion,
and the plaintiff, of adultery. Reversing the decree of the
lower court, which had granted the plaintiff a divorce, the
Mississippi Supreme Court said:
The State, whose judicial servants administer its
laws, is an interested party to the marriage contract,
and one who comes into its courts complaining of a
mote in the eye of his spouse must beware lest there
appear a disfiguring beam in his own. His own
hands must be clean." 83
Courts in the seven jurisdictions having statutes providing
that a divorce may be awarded only to "the party not at
fault" or "the innocent party" or "the innocent and in-
jured party" can, of course, justify use of the clean hands
maxim by citing their local statutes." 4 But there are four
reasons for objecting to use of this canon in support of recrim-
ination in the remaining states: (1) The requirement that
a plaintiff enter court with clean hands is a rule developed
and applied in the equity courts and is not normally invoked
in proceedings at law.1 5 A divorce action is not a proceeding
traditionally entrusted to courts of equity;116 a few states
now (by statute) commit divorce jurisidiction to equity courts,
111. 144 So. 2d at 340-41, quoting from Russ v. Russ, 150 Fla. 653, 8 So.
2d 279 (1942).
112. 201 Miss. 228, 29 So. 2d 82 (1947).
113. Id. at 233, 29 So. 2d at 83. See also Narisi v. Narisi, 229 Ark.
1059, 320 S.W.2d 757 (1957) ; Kulhfal v. Kutfal, 318 Mich. 105, 27 N.W.2d
512 (1947) ; Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657 (1933).
114. Note 19 supra and accompanying text.
115. 2 J. POMEROY, A TRFATisn ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 398 (5th ed.
1941) ; Note, Recrimination as a Bar to Divorce: Mitigating the Mandate,
51 IowA L. REv. 184, 187 (1965).
116. 24 Am. Ju. 2d Divorce and Separation § 241 (1966); 27A C.J.S.
Divorce § 69 (1959). See also Partlow v. Partlow, 246 Ala. 259, 20 So. 2d
517 (1945). Quoting from the Partlow case:
It is generally recognized in this country that the power to
grant a divorce is not within the inherent general jurisdiction
of courts of equity. Such courts have no cognizance of divorce
proceedings except by statutes which necessarily prescribe and
limit the powers of the courts ....
Id. at 261, 20 So. 2d at 518.
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but most jurisdictions do not."17 There seems to be no logical
reason for a law court (contrasted with an equity tribunal)
to deny a divorce on the basis of a maxim appropriate only
to an equity proceeding. (2) Even if invocation of the clean
hands precept were appropriate in divorce proceedings, the
maxim could be properly used against a complainant only
when his misconduct directly related to that of the defendant.
Declares McClintock:
The maxim [clean hands] is subject to the qualifi-
cation that the inequitable conduct which will defeat
plaintiff's recovery must be conduct with reference
to the transaction on which he bases his suit; relief
will not be refused merely because of plaintiff's gen-
eral bad character, nor because of particular acts of
misconduct not directly involved in the suit. Even
misconduct connected with the subject-matter of the
suit will not defeat relief, where it does not form
part of the transaction in controversy.18
If a man seeks a divorce on the ground of cruelty- or ha-
bitual intoxication and his wife attempts to recriminate by
showing that plaintiff is guilty of adultery or sodomy, it does
not appear that plaintiff's misbehavior can be said to form
"part of the transaction in controversy." Yet over half the
states permit a divorce defendant to recriminate by establish-
ing that the plaintiff is guilty of any statutory divorce
ground, regardless of whether the particular ground has any
connection with defendant's misbehavior." 9 Thus to the ex-
tent that recrimination rests upon the clean hands maxim,
the majority of American courts are acting improperly on
this matter. (3) It is well recognized that a court of equity
has discretion to disregard the clean hands canon whenever
its use would produce an unjust or unwise result.
20 "It must
117. 24 Am. Ju. 2d Divorce and Separation § 241 (1966); 27A C.J.S.
Divorce § 69 (1959).
118. H. MCOLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQur= § 26 (2d
ed. 1948) (emphasis added). Beamer agrees, as the following statement
discloses: "Strictly interpreted, it [clean hands maxim] would not apply
to divorce suits at all unless the misconduct of the petitioner was con-
ducive to that of the defedant." Beamer, supra note 53, at 248.
119. Note 27 supra and accompanying text.
120. In Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 497, 264 P.2d 691, 694 (1953)
the court states: "Equity has always regarded itself free to apply or re-
fuse to apply the maxim in a particular case, depending upon the conse-
quences and a due regard for other considerations involved." See also Note,
Recrimination as a Bar to Divorce: Mitigating the Mandate, 51 IowA L.
R v. 184, 187 (1965); Note Causes for Denying Divorce-Recrimination,
27 So. CAL. L. REv. 219 (1994).
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be remembered that the application of the 'clean hands' doc-
trine is discretionary in nature and need not be applied where
the interests of third parties or the public as a whole will be
prejudiced by its application." 121 It follows that the clean
hands precept cannot properly be used to justify the auto-
matic application of recrimination whenever both spouses
have committed misdeeds constituting grounds for divorce.
(4) Finally, to base recrimination on the clean hands rule
is to overlook the fact that in most jurisdictions misconduct
which does not amount to grounds for divorce cannot be used
in recrimination.122 If the clean hands maxim were the basis
for recrimination, then logic would demand that any divorce
petitioner who entered court with soiled hands (tarnished in
the matter in controversy) be denied relief, whether or not
his misbehavior represented grounds for divorce.
For the reasons indicated above, it is submitted that the
clean hands precept constitutes a rationalization for, rather
than justification of, the recrimination doctrine.
C. The Pani Delicto Maxim
Use of the pari delicto maxim to justify application of re-
crimination is illustrated in Mattox v. Mattox, 28 and in Roth-
well v. Rothwell. 24 In the former case the plaintiff (wife)
sought a divorce on the ground of adultery. During the trial
it was revealed that she was guilty of the same transgression,
and the court dismissed her complaint, declaring: "These
parties are in pari delicto, and to grant relief to either of
them would be offering a bounty to guilt.'' 2 5 In the Rothwell
controversy the complainant (wife) sued for a divorce on the
ground of cruelty, and defendant cross-complained for the
same relief, relying on the same ground. The trial court
granted the wife a divorce, but the Supreme Court of Oregon
reversed and dismissed, saying:
121. Comment, Divorce-Defense of Recrimination in Oregon, 2 WIL-
LIAmmTE LJ. 227, 229 (1962).
122. "The misconduct need not fall within the same statutory classifica-
tion, but it must be ground for divorce, not merely for separate mainte-
nance or divorce a mensa. If the conduct charged against the complainant
is not such as to amount to ground for divorce, there is no 'recrimina-
tion' .. . ." 1 W. NELsON, NELsON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, su n a
note 1, at § 10.01.
123. 2 Ohio 233 (1826).
124. 219 Ore. 221, 347 P.2d 63 (1959).
125. 2 Ohio at 284.
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Both parties have been at fault, and the fault of
one substantially equals the fault of the other. They
are in pari delicto, and divorce should be denied both
parties.
12
"... When the conduct of the parties is reprehensi-
ble to a kindred degree, the court ought not to inter-
fere at the instance of either."'
127
Attempts to base recrimination on the pari delicto canon
are open to two of the objections raised above (in connection
with the clean hands precept). The former maxim, like the
latter, is a creature of equity jurisprudence,128 and its use
is therefore not appropriate in a divorce action, except in those
states-a minority-which commit divorce jurisdiction to
courts of equity.1 20 However, if the courts nevertheless choose
to apply the maxim in divorce suits, they should treat the
canon as a discretionary device-as a precept to be invoked
or disregarded, depending upon which course of action will
produce the more just and desirable results. In Morrissey V.
Bologna, 1s0 a suit to cancel certain trust deeds, the Mississippi
Supreme Court stated:
"Even where the parties are in pari delicto, the courts
may interfere from motives of public policy.... in
pursuance of this principle, and in compliance with
the demands of a high public policy, equity may
aid a party equally guilty with his opponent .... ,,131
The Kansas Supreme Court, in Saylor v. Crooker, 82 an
action to enjoin defendants from selling certain land, de-
clared: "Equity does sometimes interfere to relieve one of
two parties who are in pari delicto. It will do so if its for-
bearance would result in a still greater offense against public
morals and good conscience."' 8
126. 219 Ore. at 231, 347 P.2d at 68.
127. Id. at 233-34, 347 P.2d at 68-69, quoting from Hollingsworth v.
Hollingsworth, 173 Ore. 286, 292, 145 P.2d 466, 468 (1944). The court
actually grounded its decision on a finding that neither party was shown
to be guilty of statutory cruelty, but it indicated that it would have applied
recrimination, had both spouses been guilty of this offense.
128. 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 403 (5th
ed. 1941); 27 Am JuR. 2d Equity § 141 (1966).
129. Note 102 supra and accompanying text.
130. 240 Mliss. 284, 123 So. 2d 537 (1960).
131. Id. at 297, 123 So. 2d. at 543, quoting from 2 J. POMEROY, A
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 941 (4th ed 1919).
132. 97 Kan. 624, 156 P. 737 (1916).
133. Id., 156 P. at 738. See also 27 AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 141 (1966).
[Vol. 20
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss5/1
RECRIMINATION
D. The Contract Theory
Several cases have attempted to support application of
recrimination with the argument that marriage is a contract,
and that one who seeks relief for breach of a contract resting
upon mutual and dependent covenants must first have per-
formed his own obligations.134 This rationale was used in
Jones v. Jones'3 5 and Richardson v. Richardson.136 The Jones
case was a divorce action based on adultery. At the trial
plaintiff (husband) admitted that since the parties' separa-
tion he had been living with another woman. The trial court
nevertheless granted plaintiff a divorce, but the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals reversed, saying:
[Tihe rule.., that adultery is generally held to be
a complete defense in an action for divorce upon any
ground, including that of cruel treatment, was not
predicated upon the ground that the guilty plaintiff
had committed an act constituting a statutory ground
for divorce in favor of the defendant, but ... the
basis thereof was the "general principle of the com-
mon law that whoever seeks redress for the violation
of a contract resting upon mutual and dependent
covenants, to attain success must himself have per-
formed the obligations on his part.... The doctrine
of recrimination by the defendant as a defense in
bar of the plaintiff's relief has been fully established
in this country . .. .,11
In the Richardson case the wife sought a divorce on the
ground of adultery. However, her own testimony revealed that
she had abandoned her husband without justification. The
Kings County Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, stat-
ing:
Marriage, in this state, is a civil contract, and each
party is bound to live up to it.... [P]laintiff broke
her contract with the defendant, and . . . without
justifiable cause ....
134. "[I]t would be hard if a man could complain of the breach of a
contract which he has violated." Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Ecc. '789, '790, 162
Eng. Rep. 755, '756 (1'790). See also Conant v. Conant, 10 Cal. 247
(1858); Smith v. Smith, 181 Ky. 55, 203 S.W. 884 (1918).
135. 176 S.W. 784 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1943).
136. 114 N.Y.S. 912 (1906).
137. 176 S.W. at 786.
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By every rule of construction it seems to me that
the right to relief, in these cases, as in all cases of
contract, must be predicated as well upon good faith
of and honest performance by the complaining party
as upon bad faith and nonperformance on the part of
the other party....
By first breaking the contract of marriage .. .
plaintiff forfeited her right to demand relief for the
defendant's subsequent breach of it.138
One advantage of basing recrimination on the "marriage-
is-a-contract" theory is that this theory is not a canon of
equity. Thus a court which uses this rationale has an answer
to the argument that canons of equity are inappropriate in
a divorce proceeding, which is an action at law (in most
jurisdictions). The Ohio Supreme Court discussed this point
in Opperman v. Opperman,139 a divorce suit grounded on gross
neglect of duty:
As, in this state, the Common Pleas Court in di-
vorce and alimony cases is a court of special and
limited jurisdiction having no general jurisdiction
in equity, and the statutes relating to divorce and
alimony do not expressly confer any jurisdiction to
enforce the equitable rule as to 'clean hands' or the
similar canonical doctrine of recrimination, it would
seem that so far as this state is concerned the en-
forcement of such doctrine by the courts of this
state rationally rests on the concept that he who
seeks redress for the violation of a contract resting
on mutual and dependent covenants must himself
have performed the obligation on his part .... 14)
There are three weaknesses in the marriage-is-a-contract
justification of recrimination. First, marriage is not so much
a contract as a status-and a status in which the state is
vitally interested.1
41
The execution of this [marriage] 'contract' is so cir-
cumscribed by regulations, and the state has such
138. 114 N.Y.S. at 914-15.
139. 77 Ohio App. 69, 65 N.E.2d 655 (1945).
140. Id. at 74-75, 65 N.E.2d at 658.
141. "It (marriage], certainly, does differ from ordinary common-law
contracts, by reason of its subject-matter and of the supervision which the
state exercises over the marriage relation, which the contract institutes.
In such respects, it is sui generis." Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5
N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936).
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an interest in it, that we probably would be much
better off thinking of it as a status rather than a
contract.
1 42
That marriage differs fundamentally from an ordinary
commercial contract was emphasized in Maynard V. Hill.
148
There the United States Supreme Court decided that article
I, section 10 of the Federal Constitution, prohibiting state
legislation from impairing the obligation of contracts, did not
invalidate an Oregon Territory enactment dissolving May-
nard's first marriage. Quoting from the opinion:
[Wihile marriage is often termed by text writers
and in decisions of courts as a civil contract ... it
is something more than a mere contract..., it is
an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested .... When the
contracting parties have entered into the married
state, they have not so much entered into a contract
as into a new relation, the rights, duties, and obli-
gations of which rest ... upon the general law of
the state .... 144
If marriage is a special or hybrid kind of contract, then
there is no compelling reason why its dissolution should be
governed by the rules applicable to ordinary contracts.
Second, if for the sake of argument marriage were ac-
knowledged to be an ordinary contract, then it would logi-
cally follow that the parties should be allowed to terminate
it (rescind) by mutual consent. Declares Simpson:
A contract ... may be discharged by an express
agreement that it shall no longer bind either party.
Such an agreement, called mutual rescission, is itself
a contract to discharge a prior contract. Its purpose
'is to restore the parties to the position they occu-
pied before entering into the prior contract. It needs
no other consideration.
45
142. C. CLAD, FAMILY LAW 2 (3d ed. 1964).
143. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
144. Id. at 210.
145. L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or CONTRACTS § 205 (2d ed.
1965). If, however, the contract has been executed on one side then other
consideration is necessary for a rescission.
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Yet no American jurisdiction recognizes divorce by mutual
consent,140 and in a number of states the court is expected
to deny a divorce whenever and however a recriminatory
offense is brought to its attention-even though both parties
desire a divorce. 147
Third, if marriage were considered an ordinary contract,
it would be reasonable to hold that when a spouse commits
an act constituting a recognized ground for divorce, this
represents a breach of the marital contract and excuses the
other spouse from the duty of observing its terms.148
Yet no state recognizes any form of automatic divorce, and
the courts do not limit application of recrimination to the
situation where the plaintiff was the first to commit a marital
offense.14
Thus, the attempted equation of marriage to an ordinary
contract is, for the reasons indicated above, distinctly un-
sound.
In summary, analysis reveals that none of the legalistic
defenses of the recrimination doctrine-the historical accept-
ance argument, the clean hands rule, the pan delicto maxim,
or the contract analogy-has merit.
IV. POLICY-ORIENTED REASONS OFFERED IN DEFENSE
OF RECRIMINATION
Supporters of recrimination have not based their case solely
on arguments of a legalistic nature. At least four policy-
oriented justifications of the doctrine may be found in ju-
dicial opinions: (a) By rendering divorces more difficult
146. C. CLAD, supra note 142, at 160. Admittedly, divorce by mutual con-
sent may be very common in practice-because of collusion-but it is not
sanctioned by the statutes or case law of any American state. See also
A. JACOBS & J. GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 481-82.
Twenty five jurisdictions recognize voluntary separation for a specified
period as a ground for divorce, but this ground requires more than mutual
consent alone. Am. JuR. 2d Desk Book Doc. No. 125 (Supp. 1968).
147. See note 1 supra. In other states, however, the court will not apply
the doctrine unless it has been formally pleaded as an affirmative defense.
1 W. NELsoN, supra note 1, § 10.10; 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 114 (1959).
148. "A breach by one party may suspend, or if material, may altogether
discharge the other party's performance. In either case, it affords a com-
plete excuse for such other party's nonperformance." L. SImPsoN, supra;
note 145 § 184.
149. "[Tuhe defense of recrimination may be asserted without regard to
whether the plaintiff or the defendant committed the first offense." 24
Am. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 226 (1966); accord, De Burgh v.
De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863, 250 P.2d 598, 600 (1952) (dictum) ; Whip-
pen v. Whippen, 147 Mass. 294, 17 N. E. 644 (1888).
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to procure, recrimination promotes marital stability. (b) The
rule tends to deter immorality, since a spouse is less likely to
commit adultery (or any other marital offense) if he knows
that his misdeed may bar him from obtaining a divorce at
some future time. (c) The doctrine serves to protect the
wife's economic status. (d) Recrimination prevents persons
who are obviously poor marriage risks from being freed to
contract-and probably ruin-another marriage.
A. The Marital Stability Argument
The idea that recrimination promotes marital stability was
embraced by the courts which decided Decker v. Decker'50
and Eikenbury v. Burns.151 In the former case the Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed a ruling that adultery constituted
a recriminatory offense barring the granting of a divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty,152 saying:
"The state is interested in the preservation of the
marriage relation, since this relation is promotive of
morality and innures to the perpetuation of its cit-
izens."
... It is not the policy of the law to favor divorces,
or to encourage applications for the dissolution of
the marriage relation.158
In Eikenbury the Appellate Court of Indiana affirmed a
judgment denying a wife a divorce on the ground of abandon-
ment, because of her own proven adultery. Said the court:
The state itself regulates it [marriage], because the
state has an interest in maintaining the family re-
lation .... Public policy, good morals, the interests
of society, all require that divorces shall be discour-
aged by the law .... The policy of the law in all
Christian countries has been against divorce ....
And while a divorce statute should not be construed
150. 193 Ill. 285, 61 N.E. 1108 (1901).
151. 33 Ind. App. 69, 70 N.E. 837 (1904).
152. This decision is contrary to the the statutory provisions of Illinois
which provide: "If it shall appear, to the satisfaction of the court, that...
both parties have been guilty of adultery, when adultery is the ground of
complaint, then no divorce shall be decreed." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 11
(Smith-Hurd 1956).
153. 193 II1. at 285, 61 N.E. at 1109-10, quoting from 9 Am. & ENG.
ENcyc. oF LAw Divorce 928-29 (2d ed. 1892).
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*. with a view to defeat its ends, yet it should be
construed strictly.15 4
The argument that recrimination contributes to marital
stability is infirm in at least three respects. First, it would
be more logical to use the argument in support of a pro-
posal to repeal the state statutes providing grounds for di-
vorce than to use it in defense of recrimination. Once a juris-
diction has decided to permit persons to dissolve their mar-
riage under given circumstances, it has necessarily concluded
that there are situations in which a marriage is better termi-
nated than perpetuated. If this conclusion is valid, then the
goal of marital stability should not in every instance be given
priority over all other considerations. To allow divorce on
various (and sometimes trivial) grounds and at the same
time to apply the recrimination doctrine mechanically is mani-
festly inconsistent.1 5  Second, in practice recrimination pre-
vents divorce petitioners from ending their marriage in only
a small percentage of cases, since the great majority of di-
vorce cases are uncontested.'50 Quoting from two often-cited
decisions:
I suppose that ninety-nine percent of divorces are
granted on a routine ex parte hearing after the de-
fendant has failed to appear, or has entered a general
appearance and refused to plead further. . . .Fre-
quently acquiescence reaches the verge of collusion. 57
154. 33 Ind. App. at 69, 70 N.E. at 838. A flowery expression of this
position (that recrimination conduces to marital stability) appears in
Richardson v. Richardson 114 N.Y.S. 912, 917 (1906):
[A]ll good people know that marriage is the mother of purity
and virtue and the guardian angel of the human race; that the
family is the . . . promoter of all our best achievements. For
these reasons when, as now, the moral sense of a large part
of the community seems to be dulled and deadened as to the
importance and sacredness of the marriage tie . . .it is time
that .., the servants of the law as well as its ministers should
put up bars [such as recrimination].
155. "I can not see why the law should be so concerned to maintain the
marriage status, and theoretically the home, when both spouses are at fault,
while granting wholesale dissolution of marriages when but one is at
fault." Evans v. Evans, 176 Ore. 403, 157 P.2d 495, 502 (1945) (dissentingopinion).156. "Statistics show that the vast majority of divorces granted are
uncontested and that in most cases only one of the parties appears in
court." Note, Recrimination as a Defense in Divorce Actions, 28 IowA L.
REv. 341, 342 (1943). For a sample study that tends to corroborate this,
see Feinsinger & Young, Recrimination and Related Doctrines in the Wis-
consin Law of Divorce as Administered in Dane County, 6 WIs. L. Rzv.
195 (1931).
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It bears noting how frequently divorces are un-
contested. In many cases neither spouse is 'innocent,'
and yet one of them defaults to ensure a divorce.
Thus a strict recrimination rule fails in its purpose
of denying relief to the guilty.15 8
Thus recrimination actually operates to keep the marriage
legally intact only in a small minority of divorce cases. Third,
even when the doctrine does prevent the procurement of a
divorce it holds the marriage together only in a legal sense.
To deny a divorce is one thing, but to compel-or even
enable-the parties to salvage what remains of their mar-
riage is quite another. The liberalization of American divorce
laws over the past few decades is evidently ascribable to a
gradual realization that denial of a divorce seldom restores
life to families that are sociologically dead when they enter
court.159 Declares one writer: "If anything is preserved [by
the dismissal of a divorce petition] it is but the dead and
empty shell of what has been and is no longer.' 160 If a recon-
ciliation is unlikely when one party is guilty of marital trans-
gressions, then it would seem even more improbable when
both are guilty.
The interest of society ... may be furthered by di-
vorce even though both parties are at fault, if there
is no possibility of their reconciliation.... The home
is doubly broken. The bars to cohabitation are dou-
bled .... 161
The chief vice of the [recrimination] rule . . .
is its failure to recognize that the considerations of
policy that prompt the state to consent to a divorce
when one spouse has been guilty of misconduct are
often doubly present when both spouses have been
guilty. The disruption of family relationships .. .
and the oppressive effect upon the children and
the community are intensified.
0 2
158. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 869, 250 P.2d 598, 604
(1952).159. See Beamer, supra note 53, at 249.
160. Sherman, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Massachusetts, 33 B.U.L.
REv. 454, 471 (1953).
161. Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480, 50 P.2d 264, 269 (1935) (concurring
opinion).
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As Lord Stowell observed over one hundred and fifty years
ago, to assume that the parties will even resume cohabitation
is, in most cases, to err:
I cannot blind myself to the fact that the modern
course of life and manners does not furnish those
corrections of the mischiefs that may follow, which
the canon law had anticipated in connexion with
its [recrimination] rule. There is no return to co-
habitation, nor are any means to be resorted to for
the purpose of compelling it.1e3
For the reasons set out above, the contention that recrim-
ination promotes marital stability is far from convincing.
B. The Deteirent-to-Immorality Thesis
The argument that recrimination tends to discourage hus-
bands and wives from engaging in immorality was noted in
Pavletich v. Pavletih,164 a case in which the court refused
to apply recrimination, declared defendant's charge of adul-
tery by plaintiff to be immaterial, and granted plaintiff a
divorce on the ground of incompatibility. Said the court:
[Two] possible sociological justifications for the
doctrine of recrimination can be dimly discerned be-
hind the empty incantations with which the courts
rationalize its existence and application to the cases
before them. The first is that it tends to hold the
family together; the second, that it serves as a check
upon immorality .... 1 1
Is it realistic to suppose that a spouse who is inclined to
commit adultery, cruelty, or some other marital offense is
likely to desist out of fear that his actions will enable his
mate at some future time to defeat his petition for divorce?
The person who commits adultery is normally secretive about
the act, and he does not expect his mate to learn of the deed.
Cruelty, the most commonly employed divorce ground,166 rep-
resents a pattern of conduct; and it hardly seems psychologi-
cally sound to expect that an individual with propensities
163. Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 302, 161 Eng. Rep. 747, 751
(1819).
164. 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
165. Id. at 231, 174 P.2d at 830-31.
166. Nearly sixty percent of all divorces are granted for cruelty. H.
CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 561 (1965).
[Vol. 20
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toward cruelty will (or even could) stifle these proclivities
for any substantial period of time in order to maintain his
ability to procure a divorce. The deterrent effect of recrim-
ination would therefore seem to be negligible. What little
deterrent potential the doctrine might have is doubtlessly di-
luted by the fact that most divorces are-to the knowledge
of much of the public-uncontested.
167
Certain aspects of recrimination's operation actually foster
immorality. If a spouse has once given cause for divorce,
then his mate can safely violate his marriage vows, secure
in the knowledge that the other is barred from obtaining a
divorce.168 Furthermore, if a spouse sues for divorce, and is
denied relief upon a showing of his own marital infractions,
he remains subject to the emotional and physical needs which
burden any normal human being. Being unable to satisfy
his needs inside the law, he is likely to satisfy them outside
of it.
The interest of... public morality may be furthered
by divorce even though both parties are at fault
.... It may well be doubted whether the sum total
of the public morality is increased by refusing a di-
vorce under such circumstances. The result of refus-
ing the divorce may be that each will become of-
fenders against public morality .... 169
Thus the predictable end-result of recrimination's invoca-
tion in a given case is the formation of an illicit relation-
ship (by one or both spouses) followed (commonly) by the
birth of illegitimate children. To argue that a doctrine pro-
ductive of such fruits tends to curb immorality is to argue
strangely indeed.
C. The Financial Security Argument
The contention that recrimination protects the economic
status of the wife undeniably had some merit when the canon
law adopted the principle and when Lord Stowell sat on the
bench. In those years a wife had virtually no property of
her own, because of such doctrines as seisen lure uxoris and
167. Note 156 supra.
168. This assumes that there is no condonation; for if a spouse condones
his partner's misdeed, he cannot thereafter use the transgression in recrimi-
nation. 24 Am. Jun. 2d Divorce and Separation § 232 (1966).
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curtesy.170 Furthermore, she could not make a valid con-
tract or will and could not (without acting through her hus-
band) collect her choses in action. Moreover, it was extremely
difficult for a woman to earn a living outside the home.
Few jobs were open to women, and those that were (such
as governess work and domestic service) generally paid little.
"Society had little legitimate use for women outside their
husband's homes.' 17 1 A divorcee could not hope to regain
economic security through remarriage, since the only kind
of divorce obtainable (aside from the expensive and arduous
Parliamentary divorce) was a divorce a mensa et thoro, which
amounted to merely a legal separation. Consequently, when
a man divorced his wife and thereby terminated his liability
for her debts 72 (while retaining his rights to her prop-
erty), 173 she was likely to become a public charge or a
prostitute. 74 Thus, by enabling wives sometimes to prevent
their husbands from casting them off via a divorce a mensa et
thoro, recrimination admittedly served a worthwhile social
purpose. But the woman's position in society today is vastly
different from her position in the England of Chaucer, Shake-
speare, Pope, and Byron. 7 A wife can freely contract, can
own real and personal property of her own, and can work at a
wide variety of profitable occupations outside the home. 70 In
addition, following an absolute divorce she can remarry. 77 It
170. Under the doctrine of seisen jure uxoris a man, upon marriage,
became jointly seized (with his spouse) of his wife's freeholds and exclu-
sively possessed of her leaseholds. He retained these rights during the
duration of the marriage. Upon the birth of live, legitimate issue the
husband became entitled, under the principle of curtesy, to exclusive seisen
of his mate's freehold for life. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT
ON PROPERTY 283, 287 (1951).
171. Beamer, supra note 53, at 253.
172. Govier v. Hancock, 101 Eng. Rep. 726 (1796). See also Rex v.
Flintan 35 Rev. R. 273 (1880).
173. "'The husband became entitled upon marriage to the absolute owner-
ship of his wife's chattels, the right to collect her choses in action and earn-
ings, and the sole use of her lands during the coverture. A divorce a mensa
et thoro did not affect any of those rights ... ." J. MADDEN, supra note 62
at § 97. See also Rex v. Flintan, 35 Rev. R. 273 (1830).
174. Manby v. Scott, 82 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1659).
175. G. Chaucer (1340-1400 A.D.); W. Shakespeare (1564-1616 A.D.);
A. Pope (1688-1744 A.D.); G. Byron (1788-1824 A.D.).
176. "At the turn of the century the woman's place was said to be in
the home, but today it is commonplace for a married woman to work reg-
ularly at gainful employment." Clugston v. Clugston, 197 Kan. 180, 185,
415 P.2d 226, 231 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
177. Twenty-two states have enactments restricting the right of a di-
vorcee to remarry. Eighteen jurisdictions have statutes disallowing re-
marriage for a specific period, which ranges from sixty days to two years,
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is therefore evident that the purpose which recrimination
formerly served-that of protecting offending wives from
being rendered destitute-is a function for which there is
no longer any need.
D. The Prevention-of-Subsequent-Bad-Marriages Policy
The contention that recrimination prevents persons who
are poor marriage risks from re-entering the marriage mar-
ket is weak in two respects. First, it hardly seems fair or
rational to permit a divorce-defendant to remarry when his
first spouse is free from fault and at the same time deny this
opportunity to a divorce-defendant whose first spouse is guilty
of marital transgressions. One's opportunity to contract a
subsequent marriage surely should not be determined by the
standard of behavior of his first wife (or husband). Yet
divorce-defendants who have been wedded to innocent peti-
tioners are usually allowed to remarry.175 Second, the avail-
able evidence does not in fact indicate that one-time married
divorcees-even those who occupied the position of respondent
(guilty party)-are poor marriage risks. A 1962 study dis-
closes that just over thirty percent of first remarriages end
in divorce, while twenty percent of first marriages terminate
in this manner.1'7 9 A 1956 work by a Detroit sociologist' 80
and a 1953 analysis of marriage and divorce records in Iowa
The eighteen jurisdictions comprise: ALA. CODE tit. 34, §§ 23, 38 (1964);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1224 (1965);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (1962) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1964) ;
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:302 (1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (Supp.
1966); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 8 (1964); ORLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
1280-82 (1955); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.110 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
48, § 1 (1955); S.D. CODE § 14.0707 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-831
(1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4640 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 550, 553, 560 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-118, 20-119 (1953); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 4722 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.03 (1955).
178. Statutes cited note 177 supra.
179. The failure rate figure of thirty percent for first remarriages in-
cludes widows and widowers, as well as divorcees, but there is no reason to
believe that the rate would be significantly higher if the former group were
excluded. They represent only twenty percent of remarried persons. Mona-
han, How Stable Are Remarriages?, 58 AM. J. Soc. 280 (1953). More-
over, it is reasonable to assume that upon remarriage they experience
somewhat greater difficulties of adjustment, on the average, than do
persons entering their first marriage. Being older as a class, they are
likely to have established some rigid habit patterns, which are normally
difficult to alter; and in addition, the image of the deceased mate, en-
hanced by nostalgia, is likely to make the present spouse appear inferior
by comparison. One is reminded of the old Irish proverb: "Never marry
a widow unless her first husband was hanged for horse thievery."
180. W. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE (1956).
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and Missouri""1 tend to support these figures. The former
concludes that approximately seventy percent of those who
remarry after a divorce "are and remain relatively happy"
in their new wedlock;182 the latter suggests that while di-
vorcees as a class (including persons married three or more
times) clearly exhibit a higher divorce rate than do persons
entering their first marriage, the failure rate of divorcees
who have been married only once before is not substantially
higher than that of persons who wed for the first time.183
It therefore appears that while one-time wedded divorcees
as a class achieve less success in their second marriages than
do persons contracting their first marriage, nevertheless, the
distinct majority of their first remarriages succeed. 84 Ad-
mittedly, these studies embraced all divorcees and not just
those who had occupied the position of defendant (guilty
party) ; and it is possible that the latter group has a some-
what higher divorce rate upon remarriage than does the
former. But it seems unlikely that the two groups would
exhibit a difference of more than a few percentiles in their
remarriage divorce rates. And unless the difference amounts
to more than nineteen percent (which appears exceedingly
improbable), over half the divorce-defendants who remarry
for the first time succeed in their second matrimonial at-
tempt. 85 It follows that those whom recrimination bars from
entering a new marriage cannot, considered as a group, fairly
be classified as poor marriage risks.
In conclusion, none of the policy-oriented theories sub-
mitted in justification of recrimination represents a sound
reason for retaining the doctrine.
181. Monahan, supra note 179.
182. W. GOODU, supra note 180, at 335. The author observes: "[I]t
would be surprising, even if we grant a heavy concentration of personality
deviation among divorcees, if they did not learn something about getting
along in marriage from their previous marriage."
183. Monahan, supra note 179, at 284, 286, 287 (tables 1, 4, 5). The
author emphasizes that "the divorce ratio increases with each successive
marriage." Id. at 287.
184. Monahan conjectures that such marriages may to some extent in-
volve persons who "select those who have learned from their first failure
and, wishing a second marriage, are intent upon making a success of it."
Monahan, supra note 178, at 280.
185. The writer has reached this conclusion by accepting seventy percent
as the success rate of first remarriages of all divorcees (see note 179 supra
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V. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL REFORMS
Perceiving the objectionable features of recrimination and
noting the absence of any substantial counterbalancing merits,
a number of the state legislatures and courts have devised
means of minimizing or escaping the doctrine's evils. The
means adopted are the following: (a) making recrimination's
application discretionary with the court, (b) replacing re-
crimination with the doctrine of comparative rectitude, (c)
declaring the rule to be inapplicable when the divorce ground
relied upon is voluntary separation or incompatibility, and
(d) abolishing recrimination altogether.
A. Discretionary Application of Recrimination
England and three American jurisdictions 8 6 have statutes
authorizing the court to invoke or disregard recrimination
in its discretion. Eight additional jurisdictions have adopted
this position by judicial decision.' 8 7
In England. England's Matrimonial Causes Act reads in
part as follows:
[T]he court shall not be bound to pronounce a de-
cree of divorce and may dismiss the petition if it
finds that the petitioner has during the marriage
been guilty of adultery or if, in the opinion of the
court, the petitioner has been guilty-
(ii) of cruelty . . . or
(iii) where the ground of petition is adultery or
cruelty, of having without reasonable excuse de-
serted .... 188
Although this statute clearly allows the court to grant a
divorce even when the petitioner is guilty of adultery, cruelty,
186. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1606 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.08
(1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2735.5 (Supp. 1966).
187. Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952); Vanderhuff v. Van-
derhuff, 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Matlow v. Matlow, 89 Ariz. 293,
361 P.2d 648 (1961); De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598
(1952); Stewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946); Howay
v. Howay, 74 Idaho 492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953); Burns v. Burns, 145 Mont.
1, 400 P.2d 642 (1964) ; Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950);
Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
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or desertion, for a long time after 1857, when the present
statute's antecedent was enacted, 8 9 the English courts were
slow to exercise their discretion in favor of a petitioner
guilty of those offenses. 190 Thus in Evans v. Evans,191 the
Probate Division supported its decision (denying a divorce
for adultery to a petitioner who was himself guilty of the
offense) with the following observations:
The cases which have been decided under the [Ma-
trimonial Causes] Act [of 1857] shew that the judges
of this Court have not been lenient to petitioners in
exercising a discretion in their favour .... 192
[I]t must obviously be very rarely that the Court
would be disposed to exercise its discretion in favour
of the petitioner, and I am not aware of any case
in which this has been done except the two cases...
of Symons v. Symons and ... Constantinidi v. Con-
stantinidil93 .... 104
The guiding principle to be followed by the Court
in the exercise of its discretion cannot, in my opinion,
be better expressed than in the words ... used by
Vaughan Williams, L. J. [in Constantinidi v. Con-
stantinidi]: "The Court must have regard not only
to the rights and liabilities of the matrimonial per-
son wronged and of the wrong-doer, respectively, but
also to the interests of society and public moral-
ity.,U95
However, during the World War I era, the court began
exercising its discretion in a more lenient manner, as evi-
denced by such decisions as Habra v. Habra,196 Hampson v.
189. Matrimonial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
190. "The Court formerly exercised its discretion within narrow limits,
although the discretion was unfettered .... " 12 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 311 n.(q) (3d ed. 1955).
191. [1906] P. 125.
192. Id. at 129.
193. [1897] P. 167; [1903] P. 246. There are at least two other such
cases, which the court evidently overlooked, namely Joseph v. Joseph, 34
L.J. (P.M. & A.) 96 (1865) and Coleman v. Coleman, L.R. 1 P. & D. 81
(1866). In the former case the respondent had led the petitioner to be-
lieve that she was dead and she remarried. In the latter one the respondent
had compelled the petitioner to engage in prostitution.
194. [1906] P. at 131.
195. Id. at 132.
196. [1914] P. 100. In this case there was evidence that the respondent
(wife) had condoned petitioner's adultery (although she left the petitioner
the day after she allegedly forgave him), and the court appeared to be
influenced to some extent by this consideration.
724 [Vol. 20
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Hampson,29 7 Wilson v. Wilson' 98 and Tickner v. Tickner. 99
In all of these cases the court granted divorces to petitioners
guilty of repeated acts of adultery. In the Wilson case the
court set forth more liberal standards for the exercise of a
favorable discretion than had theretofore been openly recog-
nized. The court said that it could properly consider:
(1.) the position of the children to whose interest
it is that they should have a home with the sanc-
tions of decency and, so far as may be, of the
law; (2.) the position of Amelia Brown [petitioner's
partner in adultery], for it is clearly in her interest
that she should be lawfully married; (3.) the case of
the respondent, who has long ceased to have any
relations with the petitioner, and as to whom there
is no prospect that my refusal of relief would have
the effect of reconciling her to her husband; and,
(4.) the case of the petitioner; it is in his interest
that he should be able to marry [Amelia Brown]
and live respectably. 200
The progressive tendency manifested by the Wilson deci-
sion was further exhibited by the Tickner holding. The par-
ties in the latter case wedded in 1906 and dwelled together
until 1909, when respondent's adultery and ill treatment in-
duced petitioner to leave him. Six months after moving out
petitioner obtained employment as a housekeeper to W. C.
Shortly thereafter she began living with W. C. as the latter's
wife, and the two maintained this relationship until the in-
stitution of petitioner's divorce suit in 1921. At the time of
the divorce action respondent was found cohabiting with
another woman, who had already borne him a child. In grant-
ing petitioner a divorce, the court noted:
[T]he discretion of the Court has been exercised of
late upon broader considerations that were thought
to govern it in the years immediately after the com-
197. [1914] P. 104.
198. [1920] P. 20.
199. [1924] P. 118.
200. [19201 P. at 21-22. During the ten years following this decision
there were six hundred and ninety applications by divorce petitioners for
favorable discretion. In the entire period preceding the Wilson decision
there were only sixty-four such applications. Apted v. Apted, [1930] P.
246. The sharp increase appears to be at least partly ascribable to the
liberalization of the law achieved by this case.
1968]
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ing into operation of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1857.201
[T]o refuse relief to a suitor who, in the language
of old authorities, "does not come with clean hands,"
is not so obviously simple a course as may be thought
when, as between the parties here, there are facts
which explain or extenuate the plight of the claimant
for relief, and as regards the public interest there are
weighty considerations for and against the decree
which is sought.
202
What I have really to determine is whether on
grounds of public policy, and by way of example,
she [petitioner] ought to be left under a disability to
contract a new marriage until she is set free by the
death of respondent .... I do not think virtue and
morality will be promoted by a decision having that
effect.203
Twenty years later the House of Lords in Blunt v. Blunt20 4
gave its endorsement to the liberalization of divorce law ef-
fected by the Wilson and Tickner decisions. The Blunt case
was a divorce action grounded on adultery. Respondent (wife)
cross-petitioned for a divorce on the grounds of adultery and
cruelty. Both parties admitted committing adultery. The
trial judge granted the husband a divorce, but the Court of
Appeal rescinded the decree and ruled that neither spouse
was entitled to relief. Both parties appealed to the House
of Lords, which allowed the husband's appeal and dismissed
the respondent's cross-appeal. Viscount Simon, L. C., said that
the court should give weight to the following criteria in de-
ciding how to exercise its discretion on the recrimination
question:
The utmost that can be properly done is to indicate
the chief considerations which ought to be weighed
in appropriate cases, as helping to arrive at a just
conclusion.... These four points are: (a) the posi-
tion and interest of any children of the marriage;
(b) the interest of the party with whom the peti-
tioner has been guilty of misconduct, with special
201. [1924] P. at 121.
202. Id. at 123.
203. Id. at 125.
204. [1943] A.C. 517.
[Vol. 20
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss5/1
RECRIMINATION
regard to the prospect of their future marriage;
(c) the question whether, if the marriage is not dis-
solved, there is a prospect of reconciliation between
husband and wife; (d) the interest of the petitioner,
and, in particular, the interest that the petitioner
should be able to remarry and live respectably. To
these four considerations I would add a fifth of a
more general character ... namely, the interest of
the community at large, to be judged by maintain-
ing a true balance between respect for the binding
sanctity of marriage and the social considerations
which make it contrary to public policy to insist on
the maintenance of a union which has utterly broken
down.
20 5
Although there is some difference in the wording, the
first four considerations specified in the Blunt decision are
essentially the same as those set out in the Wilson case. One
should not conclude that the Wilson, Tickner, and Blunt de-
cisions have in effect extinguished recrimination in England.
The doctrine was protected from possible extirpation by Lord
Simon's fifth criterion: the aim of "maintaining a true bal-
ance between respect for the binding sanctity of marriage"
and the wisdom of permitting a formal dissolution of a union
which has "utterly broken down." This consideration played
a significant role in the 1954 decision of Moor v. Moor,206 a
divorce action brought by a wife on the ground of adultery.
The parties married in 1929 and cohabited until 1936 when
petitioner left defendant for undisclosed reasons and began
an adulterous relationship with another man by whom she
subsequently had two children. Defendant thereafter began
living with another woman, and this union eventually pro-
duced four children. Plaintiff coupled her divorce petition
with an application that the court exercise its discretion in
her favor. The trial court denied her application, and the
Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal, saying:
It is clear that the commissioner had Blunt v.
Blunt in mind.207
The decision of the House of Lords in Blunt v. Blunt
marked a turning-point in the way the court exer-
205. Id. at 525.
206. 1 W.L.R. 927 (1954).
207. Id. at 930.
1968]
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cised its discretion in divorce cases. Whereas pre-
viously discretion was exercised in comparatively few
cases, since that decision it has been exercised in
most of the cases in which it has been sought. But
it is important to remember that .. the House of
Lords required the courts to maintain "a true bal-
ance" between the sanctity of marriage on the one
hand and the other social considerations on the
other hand.
208
The conservative cast of the Moor decision becomes evident
when one considers that of the five interests specified in
Blunt v. Blunt, only one (the fifth) could be said to be
furthered by denial of a divorce. 20 9 However, the Moor case
has not had the effect of reversing the liberalizing trend
charted by the Wilson, Tickner, and Blunt decisions, 2 10 and
in England today a petitioner who can establish valid grounds
for divorce usually has a good chance of obtaining relief,
even though he is himself guilty of adultery, cruelty, or de-
sertion.
In the United States. The three jurisdictions of Kansas,
Minnesota, and Mississippi have statutes making recrimina-
tion a discretionary bar to divorce. Provides the Kansas
enactment: "When the parties are found to be in equal fault,
the court may grant or refuse a divorce."21'
Declares the Minnesota act:
In any action brought for divorce on the ground
of adultery, although the fact of adultery be estab-
lished, the court may deny a divorce in the following
cases:
Where it is proved that the plaintiff has also been
guilty of adultery under such circumstances as would
have entitled the defendant, if innocent, to a di-
vorce. 212
208. Id. at 931 (concurring opinion).
209. That is, the welfare of the parties' six children by their new alli-
ances, the well-being of both petitioner and defendant, and the best interest
of the petitioner's and defendant's paramours would all be promoted by the
granting of a divorce, since this would make possible the legalization of
the new relationships. The prospect of a reconciliation between the parties
appeared to be exceedingly slim.
210. D. CocCAIN, DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES IN A NUTSHELL1
31 (1967).
211. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1606 (1964).
212. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.08 (1947). States the Mississippi statute:
"If a complaint or cross-complaint in a divorce action shall prove grounds
entitling him to a divorce, it shall not be mandatory on any chancellor to
728 [Vol. 20
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Eight jurisdictions have accomplished the same end by
court decision.2 13 These decisions may be grouped into four
categories: (a) decisions construing an ambiguous statutory
phrase as conferring upon the court discretion to apply or
disregard recrimination in a given case; (b) decisions hold-
ing that the addition of such divorce grounds as voluntary
separation, insanity, and incompatibility-none of which in-
volves an offense against the marriage-manifests a legisla-
tive intent to restrict the role that fault plays in divorce law,
and that it would be inconsistent with this policy to continue
applying recrimination in a mechanical manner; (c) deci-
sions reasoning that the addition of a given non-culpatory
divorce ground, such as incompatibility, reflects a legislative
intent to eliminate considerations of fault in cases involving
that particular ground, and that the mechanical application
of recrimination in cases involving that ground would frus-
trate this legislative intent; (d) decisions holding that (what-
ever the divorce ground) recrimination should be merely a
discretionary bar simply because it is contrary to sound pub-
lic policy to treat the doctrine as an absolute bar.
The three states of California, Idaho, and Montana, repre-
senting category (a), have statutes providing in part as
follows:
Divorces must be denied upon showing:
4. Recrimination .... 214
Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of
a cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of
the plaintiff's cause of divorce.2 15
In De Burgh v. De Burgh2101 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia reasoned that if the California legislature had intended
to have recrimination operate automatically whenever both
spouses were guilty of deeds constituting a divorce ground,
deny such a party a divorce, even though the evidence might establish
recrimination on the part of such complainant or cross-complainant." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2735.5 (Supp. 1966).
213. Note 187 supra.
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 111 (1954).
215. CAL. CIV. CODE § 122 (1954). The comparable enactments of Idaho
and Montana are: IDAXO CODE ANN. § 32-613 (1958); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 21-118, 128 (1961).
216. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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then the statutory phrase "in bar of plaintiff's cause of
divorce" would be superfluous. Hence the quoted phrase must
mean that in some cases a plaintiff may be entitled to a
divorce. Since the enactment does not specify the circum-
stances under which a guilty plaintiff should be granted a
divorce, the California Supreme Court determined, on the
basis of sociological considerations, that the California courts
should be guided by the following criteria: the likelihood of
reconciliation, the effect of the disharmony on the physical
and mental health of the parties, the extent to which the
discord is harming the children, and the disparity, if any,
in the guilt of the parties.217
The Idaho Supreme Court in Howay v. Howay218 and the
Montana Supreme Court in Burns v. Burns219 both relied
heavily on De Burgh as support for their decisions.220 How-
ever, the Idaho Supreme Court also stressed the following
argument: Since recrimination is grounded largely on the
"clean hands" maxim, and since it is well recognized that
the court may disregard the "clean hands" canon when its
use would produce an unjust or unwise result, it follows that
the court should be free to apply or disregard the recrimina-
tion doctrine as it deems best. Quoting from the Howay
opinion:
The doctrine of recrimination is said to be based
upon the equitable precept that he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. But, it cannot
be compared to that precept if it must be applied
manditorily by the divorce court in every case where
improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff ap-
pears, without regard to consequences or other con-
siderations having an equal claim upon the con-
science of the chancellor. Equity has always re-
garded itself free to apply or refuse to apply the
maxim in a particular case, depending on the con-
217. Id. at 872-73, 250 P.2d at 603-04.
218. 74 Idaho 492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953).
219. 145 Mont. 1, 400 P.2d 642 (1964).
220. The Idaho Supreme Court (explaining: "We quote at length from
that [the Do Burgh] decision because of the identity of the statutes con-
sidered to our own.") devoted over a page to quoting from the De Burgh
opinion, and the Montana Supreme Court devoted three-quarters of a page
to a discussion of the Do Burgh case. The Montana Supreme Court also
relied to a limited extent on the Howay decision.
[Vol. 20
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sequences and a due regard for other considerations
involved.
221
The courts of the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands, comprising category (b), justified their decisions in
Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff22 2 and Burch v. Butrch223 with
essentially the following argument: By adding non-culpatory
divorce grounds the legislature disclosed an intent to curtail
the role that fault plays in divorce law, and it would defeat
this aim to continue invoking recrimination in a mechanical
manner. In the Vanderhuff case the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed a decree
granting the plaintiff a divorce (on the ground that defend-
ant had been convicted of a felony) even though there was
evidence tending to show that plaintiff was guilty of adultery.
Said the court:
We believe our present statute2 24 has changed the
policy which made recrimination an absolute bar to
divorce. The statute now provides four grounds for
divorce .... Grounds (3) and (4) [voluntary sep-
aration for five years and conviction of a felony
involving moral turpitude] may exist in the absence
of any offense against the marital status itself. We
have already held that recrimination is not a de-
fense in the case of voluntary separation from bed
and board for five years. In so deciding we said that
the purpose of the liberalizing amendment was "to
permit termination in law of certain marriages
which have ceased to exist in fact" ....
Our opinion in this case is limited to a ruling that
recrimination is not an absolute bar to a divorce.
225
The Burch controversy was a divorce action grounded on
incompatibility. The defendant (wife) asked for a dismissal
of the complaint, charging that plaintiff was guilty of cruel
treatment. The District Court of the Virgin Islands granted
plaintiff a divorce, and the United States Court of Appeals
affirmed, speaking as follows:
[I]t is perfectly clear that in the case of at least
two of the grounds for divorce recognized by the
221. 74 Idaho at 496-97, 264 P.2d at 694.
222. 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
223. 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
224. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1940).
225. 144 F.2d at 509-10.
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statute, impotency existing at the time of the mar-
riage and insanity occurring after marriage, there
can be no question of either innocence or guilt ....
[I]ncompatibility of temperament necessarily in-
volves both parties.
In accord with what we believe to be the legislative
intent we hold that the defense of recrimination is
not a bar to the granting of a divorce under the
laws of the Virgin Islands except in the circum-
stances specified in Section 10 of the Divorce Law
.... 220 We think, however, that evidence of miscon-
duct on the part of the plaintiff may be considered
by the court along with all the other evidence in de-
termining whether, in the discretion of the court,
the best interests of the parties and of the public
will be served by the granting of a divorce.
227
The position taken by New Mexico, the sole representative
of category (c), is that the legislature, by adding the fault-
free divorce ground of incompatibility, manifested an intent
to give the court authority, in cases grounded on incompati-
bility, to apply or disregard recrimination in its discretion. 228
The Supreme Court of New Mexico adopted this approach
in Pavletick v. Pavletich229 and Clark v. Clark.230  In the
former case the court affirmed a decree awarding a divorce
for incompatibility even though there was evidence that
plaintiff was guilty of adultery. Quoting from the opinion:
226. "In an action for the dissolution of the marriage contract on account
of adultery the defendant may admit the adultery and show in bar of the
action: (3) That the plaintiff has been guilty of adultery also without the
procurement or connivance of the defendant .... " DIvORCE LAW OF VIRGIN
Is. § 10 (1947).
227. 195 F.2d at 807, 808, 810; accord, Shearer v. Shearer, 356 F.2d 391
(3d Cir. 1965).
In Burck the court was concerned not only with the applicability of the
recrimination doctrine, but also with the interpretation of a statutory
phrase limiting the right to obtain a divorce to the "injured party." Di-
VORCE LAW OF THE VIRGIN IS. § 7 (1947). The court decided that a divorce
petitioner could be an "injured party" without being an innocent party.
195 F.2d at 807.
228. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have held that the defense of
recrimination has no application when the plaintiff bases his action on a
non-culpatory ground, such as voluntary separation or incompatibility.
See pt. V(e) infra. New Mexico appears unique in holding that in such
a situation recrimination continues to have application but may be disre-
garded in the court's discretion.
229. 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
230. 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950).
[Vol. 20
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Some of the lexicographers give 'irreconcilableness'
as a synonym [for incompatibility]. We venture the
suggestion that this is an important factor to be
considered in granting or refusing divorces upon the
ground of incompatibility.
If the chancellor believes the parties are reconcil-
able, he will, no doubt, endeavor to bring about a
reconciliation. But where the parties are irreconcil-
able we believe that the public policy of this state,
as expressed by the legislature, is against denying a
divorce on the doctrine of recrimination.
231
In the Clark case, decided four years later, the same court
reversed a decision granting the plaintiff a divorce for in-
compatibility, because the trial court had refused to admit
evidence that plaintiff had committed adultery. Explaining
why it was reversing, the court said that the trial judge
erred in concluding that he was compelled (by the Pavletich
ruling) to grant a divorce if he once found that the parties
were incompatible, even though plaintiff should be guilty of
adultery. Rather, the Pavletich decision stands for the prop-
osition that if the parties are found to be incompatible, the
court should, after receiving all proffered evidence of recrim-
ination, apply or disregard the doctrine, depending upon his
judgment on the equities of the case. Quoting Justice Sadler:
[A] s to other defenses traditionally employed by way
of recrimination .. there resides in the trial judge
the discretion to say whether, notwithstanding such
incompatibility, it shocks the conscience to hold such
plaintiff entitled to a divorce by reason thereof.
32
The courts of Arizona and Florida, comprising category
(d), defended their decisions in Matlow v. Matow23s and
Stewart v. Stewart s 4 mainly with a simple policy argument:
231. 50 N.M. at 233, 174 P.2d at 832.
232. 54 N.M. at 368, 225 P.2d at 149. Commenting on Clark, an
American Law Report annotator says:
The decision of the majority in the Clark case seems to es-
tablish the rule that while recrimination is not an absolute
defense in cases of this kind ... it is not immaterial, as indi-
cated in the Pavletich case, and it may be considered by the
chancellor and may warrant a denial of divorce, in the discre-
tion of the chancellor, if it would shock the conscience to grant
the divorce.
Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1267, 1268 (1952).
233. 89 Ariz. 293, 361 P.2d 648 (1961).
234. 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946).
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Treating recrimination as a discretionary bar is more con-
sistent with good public policy than treating the doctrine
as an absolute bar. As a supporting argument, both courts
relied on the thesis that recrimination, being a child of the
"clean hands" maxim, should, like its parent, be regarded
as a discretionary bar to relief. In the Matlow case the Su-
preme Court of Arizona affirmed a decree awarding the
petitioner a divorce for cruelty even though there was evi-
dence tending to show that petitioner was also guilty of
cruelty. Explaining its ruling, the court said:
To hold that any recrimination would bar a divorce
would be a degradation of marriage and a frustra-
tion of its purposes, for then the courts would be
using recrimination as a device for punishment. If
the marriage has failed and the family life has
ceased, the purposes of marriage are no longer
served .... The doctrine of recrimination, like the
doctrine of unclean hands of which it is a part, is
not a mechanical doctrine but an equitable principle
to be applied to the facts of each case and with a
consideration for the interests of the public.285
In the Stewart controversy the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment granting the plaintiff a divorce for
desertion although there was considerable evidence that plain-
tiff had committed adultery. In justification of this decision,
the court said:
The application of the doctrine of recrimination
in divorce cases is an outgrowth of the equity maxim
that 'he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands.'
It is not an absolute but a qualifying doctrine....
The application of the doctrine of recrimination
... is a matter of sound judicial discretion depend-
ant on public policy, public welfare, and the exigen-
cies of the case at bar.280
235. 89 Ariz. at 297-98, 361 P.2d at 650.
236. 158 Fla. at 236, 29 So. 2d at 248-49. The Stewart case has been re-
garded as an adoption of the comparative rectitude doctrine. A. JACOBS & J.
GOEr.L, supra note 1, at 450. These authors apparently base their interpre-
tation on the court's statement that "the master and Chancellor found the
cquities with the plaintiff and it has not been made to affirmatively appear
that inequity has been done by the Chancellor by his decree of divorce."
734 [Vol. 20
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B. The Doctrine of Comparative Rectitude
The courts of Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and Utah have
embraced the doctrine of comparative rectitude, which may
be defined as "the principle that ... relief by way of divorce
may be given to the party least at fault, although both parties
have shown ground for divorce. '2 37 If the parties appear to
be equally at fault, a divorce will be denied.
238
The case of Ayers v. Ayers289 demonstrates Arkansas' ac-
ceptance of comparative rectitude. There the Supreme Court
of Arkansas ruled that the appellant, who had crossed-com-
plained for a divorce on the ground of adultery, was entitled
to a decree even though he was guilty of conduct entitling his
wife, had she been innocent, to a divorce for personal in-
dignities. Said the court:
[T]he question is whether both parties should be
denied a divorce when the husband has been guilty
of indignities and the wife of adultery . . . . "We
concur in the finding of the court below that both
parties were at fault, but we think appellee [the
wife] was the greater and the first offender, and
29 So. 2d at 248. They (Jacobs and Goebel) may also be influenced by
the fact that much of the dissenting opinion is devoted to a discussion of
comparative rectitude. However, the majority opinion nowhere states or
implies that the decision should be considered an adoption of comparative
rectitude and in fact nowhere makes any reference to the doctrine. In view
of this consideration, and in view of the court's statement that recrimi-
nation "is not an absolute but a qualifying doctrine," the writer construes
the holding as an adoption of the view that recrimination is a discretionary
bar to divorce.
237. Annot., 159 A.L.R. 734 (1945). "Under this doctrine [comparative
rectitude] ... the party whose hands are soiled the least is entitled to a
divorce." Raskin & Katz, The Dying Doctrine of Recrimination in the
United States of America, 35 CAN. BAR REv. 1046, 1048 (1957).
Wisconsin has adopted comparative rectitude by statute but has re-
stricted the doctrine's operation so as to permit the spouse who is the
less at fault merely to obtain a legal separation. The Wisconsin statute
reads:
The equitable doctrine that the court shall not aid a wrong-
doer is applicable to any party suing for divorce under §
247.07(1) to (5) except that where it appears ... that both
parties have been guilty of misconduct sufficiently grave to
constitute cause for divorce, the court may in its discretion
grant a judgment of legal separation to the party whose equi-
ties on the whole are found to be superior.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.101 (Supp. 1967).
238. "Where the court finds that the parties are equally at fault, it
will refuse to grant relief to either party." 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and
Separation § 228 (1966). See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 230 Ark. 213, 322
S.W.2d 77 (1959); Gayle v. Gayle, 181 So. 2d 72 (La. 1965); Lee v. Lee,
145 So. 2d 618 (La. 1962).
239. 266 Ark. 394, 290 S.W.2d 24 (1956).
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we have concluded, under the case made, that a
decree of divorce should be awarded appellant; and it
will be so ordered.'240
The leading case on comparative rectitude in Louisiana is
EalB v. Swan.241 This was a legal separation action grounded
on cruel treatment. The defendant (husband) cross-petitioned
for a separation, alleging abandonment. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana affirmed a judgment granting plaintiff a sep-
aration, saying:
[T]he learned trial judge... stated in his reasons for
judgment that ... he believed the fault of the de-
fendant husband far outweighed that of plaintiff....
The Louisiana rule is that while mutual, equal
fault operates as a bar to relief being given to either
litigant, the courts consider in each case the degree
of guilt, and only where there is a finding of fact
that the degree of guilt has been equal is the suit dis-
missed. The rule of comparative rectitude has been
impliedly recognized. 242
Texas has not only adopted the doctrine of comparative
rectitude but has further restricted recrimination, by limit-
ing the doctrine's application to the situation where the
parties' infractions are of the same general character2 48 and
240. Id., 290 S.W.2d at 25, quoting from Longinotti v. Longinotti, 169
Ark. 1001, 277 S.W. 41 (1925), where the same court granted the plaintiff
a divorce for adultery even though there was substantial evidence support-
ing defendant's cross-complaint of cruelty.
In Moore v. Moore, 230 Ark. 213, 322 S.W.2d 77 (1959), it was held that
recrimination barred the awarding of a divorce to either party, since both
spouses were guilty of adultery and therefore were equally culpable.
241. 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952).
242. Id. at 332-33, 59 So. 2d at 409-10. Other Louisiana cases ap-
plying the comparative rectitude doctrine are Gilbert v. Hutchinson, 135
So. 2d 283 (La. 1961), and Smith v. Smith, 139 So. 2d 813 (La. 1962).
These cases, like Eals av. Swan, involve use of the principle in a legal sepa-
ration suit. The dearth of divorce (a viniculo) cases involving application
of comparative rectitude is explained by the fact that, in the absence of a
separation, the only divorce grounds recognized in Louisiana are adultery
and imprisonment for conviction of a felony. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 139
(1959).
243. Oxspring v. Oxspring, 393 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965);
Hutt v. Hutt, 76 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1934). In the former case
the court affirmed a judgment granting plaintiff a divorce for cruelty
even though there was evidence of improper conduct (not described in the
reports) on plaintiff's part. Said the court:
To establish the defense of recrimination the evidence must
establish conduct on the part of the one seeking a divorce of the
same general character as that of the defendant and such as
would be reasonably calculated to have provoked the miscon-
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to the case where defendant's misconduct was induced or
provoked by that of plaintiff.244 However, when these con-
ditions are met, recrimination still operates in Texas-most
commonly in instances where both spouses are guilty of adul-
tery245 or of cruelty.246
A case illustrating the application of comparative rectitude
in Texas is Marr v. Marr.247 The husband sued for divorce
on the ground of cruelty, and his wife cross-petitioned for a
divorce on the same ground. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed a judgment granting the wife a divorce, notwith-
standing a special finding by the jury that she was also guilty
of cruelty. Said the court:
In Texas ... comparative rectitude is recognized.
We have reached the conclusion that the acts and
conduct of appellee, the wife, toward the appellant,
the husband, are insignificant when compared to his
conduct toward her, and though guilty of recrimina-
duct charged against the defendant .... We cannot say that
the evidence establishes such conduct on the appellee's part as
a matter of law.
393 S.W.2d 369, 369-70. But see Jones v. Jones, 176 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1943). Here a husband seeking a divorce for cruelty was denied
relief because he was guilty of adultery. The court did not comment on
the fact that the two offenses were not of a similar character.
244. Trigg v. Trigg, 18 S.W. 313 (Tex. 1891) and Ward v. Ward, 352
S.W.2d 513 (Tex. 1962). In the former case the Supreme Court of Texas
affirmed a decree awarding a wife a divorce for cruelty although there
was evidence tending to show cruelty on the part of complainant. Quoting
from the opinion:
Whatever may have been the character of the acts of the ap-
pellee [wife] which are complained of as recriminatory, it is
evident that they were committed only when provoked by de-
fendant's conduct .... But it is the important and the recog-
nized rule that recrimination, as a valid defense, must arise
out of the fact that the acts or conduct [of defendant] for
which the plaintiff seeks a divorce were induced by or in re-
taliation of plaintiff's conduct.
18 S.W. at 316.
245. Oster v. Oster, 130 S.W. 265 (Tex. 1910) ; Haines v. Haines, 62 Tex.
216 (1884). A Texas statute expressly provides for the application of re-
crimination where both parties are guilty of adultery. TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4630 (1960). See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
246. Hausladen v. Hausladen, 388 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1965); Beck v. Beck,
63 Tex. 34 (1885). In the Hausladen decision the ruling denying a divorce
was based only partly on the ground that recrimination was applicable.
In Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1949) (dictum) the
court stated: "In such cases [based on cruelty], it cannot be doubted that
recrimination of acts by plaintiff comparable to the cruel treatment al-
leged presents a defense to divorce on that ground." See Comment, supra
note 53, at 62, 65-66.
247. 191 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1945).
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tion to some degree, her acts are not sufficient to
bar a judgment in her favor.248
A case evidencing Utah's acceptance of comparative recti-
tude is Hendricks v. Hendriks,249 a divorce suit grounded on
cruelty. Defendant (husband) counterclaimed for a divorce
on the same ground. After finding that both spouses were
guilty of cruelty the trial court invoked recrimination and
dismissed the action. However, the Supreme Court of Utah
reversed and ordered the granting of a divorce to the party
less at fault. Quoting from the opinion:
To affirm that a guilty spouse is never entitled
to a divorce is a position difficult to apply to the
facts of life. It is seldom, perhaps never, that any
wholly innocent party seeks a divorce against one
who is wholly guilty. Awareness of this fact and the
giving of attention to the social implications of di-
vorce has given rise to various exceptions and limita-
tions on the doctrine of recrimination. . . . [T]he
doctrine of 'comparative rectitude' . . . is often used
and has been given tacit recognition by this court.
:.. [T]he trial court would best perform its function
in the administration of justice by determining which
party was least at fault, granting a divorce and ad-
justing their rights .... 2G0
Although but four states have openly embraced the doctrine
of comparative rectitude, the writer suspects that courts in
other jurisdictions often accomplish the same end by de-
liberately "finding" that the misconduct of the spouse less
at fault is not sufficiently culpable to constitute grounds for
divorce-that is, that the cruelty relied upon is not "extreme"
(or "intolerable"); that the asserted intoxication does not
appear "habitual"; or that the alleged neglect does not qualify
as "gross." Since most jurisdictions hold that recrimination
is applicable only when the complainant's misdeeds amount to
248. Id. at 513-14; accord, Watts v. Watts, 390 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1964);
McFadden v. McFadden, 213 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. 1948). Quoting from Watts
at page 32: "It is well recognized that the doctrine of comparative recti-
tude is recognized in Texas. Under it... the court has the duty of weigh-
ing the conduct of the respective parties, and is authorized to grant a di-
vorce to the one who is less guilty."
249. 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953).
250. Id., 257 P.2d at 366-67; accord, Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273,
293 P.2d 418 (1956).
[Vol. 20
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grounds for divorce,25' the doctrine would not operate in any
of the situations just described. Declares an annotator in the
American Law Reports:
Although . . . few cases refer to the doctrine of
comparative rectitude in express language ... there
are a number of decisions with respect to which it
would seem .. from the actual decree rendered or
directed, or from the factual situation appearing, the
contentions of the parties . . . and the treatment of
the judgment below by the appellate court, that ap-
proval of the theory underlying the doctrine was
accorded or that an actual application of the principle
was made without any express invocation or recog-
nition of it.252
C. Inapplicability of Recrimination When Divorce Ground
is Voluntary Separation or Incompatibility
Of the twenty five jurisdictions 253 which recognize volun-
tary separation for a specified period as a ground for divorce,
five have declared by statute,254 and seven have determined by
court decision, 255 that a suit based on this ground cannot be
251. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 67b (1959). H. PnPEL & G. ZAvyN, Youit
MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 296 (1952). See, e.g., Redding v. Redding, 317
Mass. 760, 59 N.E.2d 775 (1945).
252. Annot., 159 A.L.R. 734, 735-36 (1945).
253. AiA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1) (1959); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312
(1956); ARE. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46-1-1 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-13 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1522 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961); HAWAH REV.
LAws § 324-1 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-619 (1958); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.020 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139 (1957); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 24 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (1947); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 125.010 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.7 (1955); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-5 (1950); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page 1960); R.I
GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-5-3 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-802 (1955);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-91
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE §
26-08-020 (1965); Wis. STAT. § 247.07 (1955); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-38
(1957).
254. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1) (1964); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202
(7) (Supp. 1963); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (1963); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-91 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.101 (Supp. 1967).
255. Unger v. Unger, 174 A.2d 84 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961) ; Finnegan
v. Finnegan, 76 Idaho 500, 285 P.2d 488 (1955); Jolliffe v. Jolliffe, 76
Idaho 95, 278 P.2d 200 (1954); Raymond v. Carrano, 112 La. 869, 36 So.
787 (1904); Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960); Matysek
v. Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1957); Edmisten v. Edmisten, 265
N.C. 488, 144 S.E.2d 404 (1965) ; Jones v. Jones, 261 N.C. 612, 135 S.E.2d
554 (1965); Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R.I. 230, 106 A. 801 (1919); Helfer v.
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defeated by recrimination. Two of the three jurisdictions2 56
which allow a divorce for incompatibility have proclaimed
by judicial decree that recrimination constitutes merely a dis-
cretionary bar to an action based on this ground.
257
Of the five jurisdictions which provide by statute that re-
crimination has no application to a suit grounded on voluntary
separation the enactments of Alabama, Arkansas, and Vir-
ginia are the most explicit. They read as follows:
The circuit court in equity shall have the power
to divorce persons from the bonds of matrimony in
favor of either party where there has been a final
decree of divorce from bed and board, or of separate
maintenance, when such decree has been in force
and effect for more than four years. The fact that
the party against whom such action is brought may
also have some ground for divorce shall not consti-
tute any defense to any proceeding under this sec-
tion.2
58
Where either husband or wife has lived separate
and apart from the other for three consecutive years,
without cohabitation, the court shall grant an abso-
lute decree of divorce at the suit of either party,
whether such separation was the voluntary act or
by the mutual consent of the parties, and the question
of who is the injured party shall be considered only
in cases wherein by the pleadings the wife seeks
either alimony.., or a division of property... or
both.25
0
A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be
decreed:
(9) On the application of either party if and whfn
the husband and wife have lived separate and apart
without any cohabitation and without interruption
for two years. A plea of . . . recrimination with
266. ALASKA STAT. § 56-5-1 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953);
DiVoRCE LAW or VIGIN Is. § 4 (1947).
257. The courts of New Mexico and the Virgin Islands have so ruled.
The relevant cases (which have been fully discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 227, 231, 232 supra) are: Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1952) ; Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950) ; Pav-
letich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
258. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 22 (1) (1959).
259. ARK. STAT. ANN. 34-1202 (7) (1947).
[Vol. 20
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respect to any other provision of this section shall
not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce on
this ground.260
In Fuqua v. Fuqua2 61 a divorce suit grounded on the Ala-
bama statute, defendant (wife) argued that the attempted
abolition of recrimination was unconstitutional, since it repre-
sented an endeavor to destroy matrimonial rights already
acquired.262 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a decree
overruling defendant's demurrer and granting plaintiff a di-
vorce. Said the court:
[U]ntenable is the argument that the Act is un-
constitutional because the defense of recrimination
is abolished .... [A] sufficient answer is that the
legislature has complete authority in matters of di-
vorce and may add to or take away any grounds it
so desires.
263
Although it would seem fairly obvious from the wording
of the Arkansas enactment that the state legislature intended
to abolish recrimination as a defense in actions based on
voluntary separation, this point was nevertheless disputed
in Young v. Young.264 The husband sued for divorce and
relied on voluntary separation. His wife defended with the
charge that plaintiff was guilty of adultery. The trial court
ordered the striking of this defense and awarded plaintiff a
divorce. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, saying:
It will be observed that in the... act the Legislature
has eliminated all consideration of which spouse is
the guilty party, except in settling property and ali-
mony rights. Since these rights are not involved in
this case the result, here, is that the Court is for-
bidden to consider which is the guilty party. In
other words, recrimination is abolished as a defense
under this three year separation statute.
26
In contrast to the explicit statutes of Alabama, Arkansas,
and Virginia, the enactments of Kentucky and Wisconsin
260. VA. CoDn ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1968).
261. 268 Ala. 127, 104 So. 2d 925 (1958).
262. Id. at 128, 104 So. 2d at 926.
263. Id. at 130, 104 So. 2d at 927.
264. 207 Ark. 36, 178 S.W.2d 994 (1944).
265. Id., 178 S.W.2d at 997.
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merely imply that a divorce suit grounded on voluntary sepa-
ration cannot be barred by recrimination. This implication
is accomplished by statutory declarations that recrimination
will defeat a suit based on other grounds. The Kentucky and
Wisconsin acts read (in part) as follows:
A divorce may be granted to either party for the
following causes:
(b) Living apart without any cohabitation for
five consecutive years next before application.
(2) A divorce may be granted to the party not in
fault for the following causes .... 266
The equitable doctrine that the court shall not aid
a wrongdoer is applicable to any party suing for a
divorce under § 274.07 (1) to (5) . . . 267
Other sections of the Wisconsin act provide for the granting
of a divorce when the parties have voluntarily lived apart for
the past five years or have dwelled apart for that period
pursuant to a judgment of legal separation.268
That recrimination is not invokable under the Kentucky
statute in suits based on voluntary separation was definitely
established in Ward v. Ward.269 The husband petitioned for
divorce and relied on the above-quoted provision (b). The
wife counterclaimed for a divorce, charging cruelty. The
trial court dismissed the husband's petition and granted his
wife a divorce for cruelty. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
affirmed in order to effectuate petitioner's basic aim of
terminating his marriage, but stated that the trial court
should have granted the divorce to the husband, regardless of
whether he was guilty of cruelty.270 Said the court:
[I]t was uncontradictedly proven.., that the parties
separated and had not lived or cohabited together
since July 11, 1911, a period of more than five
years next before the filing of the petition, and
which proven facts entitled the husband to a divorce,
266. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.020 (1963).
267. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.101 (Supp. 1967).
268. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (6)-(7) (Supp. 1967).
269. 213 Ky. 606 181 S.W. 801 (1926).
270. The court added that it was affirming on the ground of five years'
voluntary separation, not on the ground of cruelty.
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regardless of the question as to who was to blame
for the separation .... The court, therefore, was
in error in dismissing plaintiff's petition.
27'1
Most of the seven jurisdictions in which the courts have,
without statutory direction, abolished recrimination as a de-
fense in divorce suits founded on voluntary separation ap-
pear to have been influenced mainly by one (or both) of the
following two considerations: (1) Since the ground of volun-
tary separation is non-culpatory in character, it seems in-
appropriate to recognize recrimination-a doctrine which em-
phasizes the concept of fault-as a bar to a suit based on this
ground. (2) When the spouses have voluntarily dwelled apart
for the requisite number of years, the marriage normally has
already ended in fact; hence it seems pointless to invoke
recrimination and deny the parties a divorce.
The case of Mctysek v. Matysek272 contains probably the
best statement of the first consideration. This was a divorce
action grounded on three years' voluntary separation. De-
fendant (husband) attempted to frustrate the suit by show-
ing that plaintiff had committed adultery. Although the adul-
tery was established, the trial court granted plaintiff a
divorce, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, ob-
serving:
The recrimination rule is a derivative of the "clean
hands" doctrine of Equity which holds that a plain-
tiff who seeks a divorce for the defendant's mis-
conduct should have no cause to complain thereof
if he himself has committed equal or greater mis-
conduct. But this logic fails of application to this
novel ground for divorce which does not involve any
misconduct of the defendant. The "clean hands" of
the plaintiff are immaterial when the case is not con-
271. 213 Ky. at 606, 181 S.W. at 802; accord, Best v. Best, 218 Ky. 648,
291 S.W. 1032 (1927), where the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a
judgment awarding the petitioner (husband) a divorce on the ground of
five years' separation, saying:
The answer nowhere denied the five years' separation relied
on in the petition, but ... sought to deprive plaintiff of the
benefit of that ground, because... he was guilty of cruel and
inhuman treatment toward defendant .... But if that were
true, it would not defeat the particular statutory ground, since
it is available regardless of the fault of the parties or either of
them causing the separation.
Id., 291 S.W. at 1032.
272. 212 Md. 44, 128 A.2d 627 (1957).
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cerned with the "unclean hands" of the defendant.
The whole recrimination defense is tied up with the
misconduct theory of divorce which has been totally
departed from in this added ground. Hence it has
no application. 2
73
The second consideration was stressed in Jolliffe V. Jol-
liffe,2 74 a divorce suit founded on five years' voluntary sep-
aration. Defendant (wife) alleged that plaintiff was guilty
of willful neglect and extreme cruelty. The Supreme Court
of Idaho affirmed a judgment granting plaintiff a divorce,
saying:
[A] recriminatory defense is not available in an
action for divorce on the ground of five years' sep-
aration ....
"The public policy of these separation statutes is
based upon the proposition that where a husband
and wife have lived apart for a long period of time,
without any intention ever to resume conjugal rela-
tions, the best interests of society and the parties
themselves will be promoted by a dissolution of the
marital bond."
"It is the policy of the state, where the husband and
wife have, for so long a time, failed to become recon-
ciled, not to compel them to continue in a marital
status which is ostensible rather than real.
'275
The first of the two considerations just discussed-the ar-
gument that it is illogical to treat a fault-oriented doctrine
as a bar to a suit based on a non-culpatory ground-would
appear to have equal application to actions founded on other
non-culpatory grounds, such as insanity, impotency, and drug
addiction.2
7 6
273. Id. 128 A.2d at 632-33, quoting from Comment, Five Years Volun-
tary Separation as New Ground for Absolute Divorce, 2 Mn. L. REv. 357,
361 (1938). The court used similar reasoning in Finnegan v. Finnegan, 76
Idaho 500, 285 P.2d 488 (1955).
274. 76 Idaho 95, 278 P.2d 200 (1955).
275. Id. at 100, 278 P.2d at 202-03, quoting from Annot., 51 A.L.R. 763
(1927) (first quotation); McKenna v. McKenna, 53 R.I. 373, 166 A.
822 (1933) (second quotation). See also Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S.W.2d
132, 136 (Tex. 1949).
276. Hochwarth Recrimination as a Bar to Divorce on Ground of Three
Year Voluntary S'eparation, 17 MD. L. Rav. 268, 272 (1957). According to
the author:
Insanity is non-culpatory in its nature. The ground of im-
prisonment for a felony is culpatory in itself, but non-culpatory
so far as matrimonial offenses are concerned. It appears rea-
[Vol. 20744
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D. Complete Abolition of Recrimination
Five states--Colorado, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and Washington-have enacted statutes abolishing recrimina-
tion altogether. Provides the Colorado statute:
If, upon the trial of an action for divorce, either
or both of the parties shall be found guilty of any
one, or more, of the grounds for divorce, then a di-
vorce may be granted to either, or both, of said
parties in accordance with such findings.
277
In Schrader v. Schrader278 the Colorado Supreme Court, af-
firming a decree granting a divorce for cruelty to a plaintiff
who was himself found to be guilty of cruelty, relied upon
the above enactment. The court simply observed:
It should be noted that the defense of recrim-
ination is no longer a part of the law of Colorado,
and that the lower court, in consequence of the stat-
ute, acted properly in granting a divorce to the hus-
band, although it found him guilty of cruelty toward
the wife.2
79
States the Nevada act:
In any action for divorce when it shall appear
to the court that both husband and wife have been
guilty of a wrong or wrongs which may constitute
grounds for a divorce, the court shall not for this
reason deny a divorce, but in its discretion may
grant a divorce to the party least in fault, if both
parties seek a divorce, otherwise to the party seek-
ing the divorce, even if such party be the party
most at fault.2
80
Without the last seventeen words, this statute would con-
stitute merely a legislative adoption of the comparative recti-
tude theory. It is the addition of the phrase beginning with
"otherwise" that completely eradicates recrimination.
sonable that the fault of the plaintiff should not be a bar to
a divorce based on these grounds, for the same reasoning
as applied by the courts in suits based on voluntary separa-
tion. The misconduct theory of divorce has been abandoned
for these grounds, and therefore the misconduct of the plaintiff
should be immaterial.
277. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-4 (3) (1960).
278. 156 Colo. 521, 400 P.2d 675 (1965).
279. Id. at 527, 400 P.2d at 678.
280. NEv. Ray. STAT. § 125.120 (1957).
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Declares the North Dakota enactment:




4. Limitation and lapse of time.
281
The absence of recrimination from the statutory list of
defenses becomes more significant when it is noted that prior
to 1963 recrimination appeared on the list. The change came
about primarily as the result of the decision in Kucera v.
Kucera .28 2 In that case the North Dakota Supreme Court,
acting with manifest reluctance, ruled that a divorce pe-
titioner (wife) who established cruelty by her spouse was
not entitled to relief, since she was also guilty of cruelty (and
desertion as well). The court acknowledged that "the legiti-
mate ends of the marriage have been destroyd and a divorce
perhaps would be the better solution," 288 but stated that it
was compelled by the mandatory provisions of the statute
to invoke recrimination in bar of a divorce. The following
year the state legislature took the hint and amended the
enactment to delete recrimination.
Provides the Oklahoma act:
That the parties appear to be in equal wrong shall
not be a basis for refusing to grant a divorce, but
if a divorce is granted in such circumstances, it shall
be granted to both parties.
284
This enactment determined the decision in Mitchell v.
Mitchell.2 5 There the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed
(with modification) a decree granting both parties a di-
vorce on the ground of incompatibility, saying:
"In Oklahoma there is no proscription against di-
vorcing parties who are both at fault; and where one
of them seeks the divorce and the other does not, a
decree awarding the divorce to both may be modified
281. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-10 (1966).
282. 117 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1962).
283. Id. at 814.
284. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1275 (1961).
285. 885 P.2d 462 (Okla. 1963).
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on appeal to reflect its award to the one seeking
it.,286
Finally, the Washington statute declares:
The defendant may, in addition to his or her
answer, file a cross-complaint for divorce or annul-
ment, if any, in favor of either party, or as if it




The enactment of this statute did not produce a great
change in Washington divorce law, for the courts of that
state had already emasculated recrimination by adopting the
doctrine of comparative rectitude28 8 and confining the appli-
cation of recrimination to the situation where the parties'
infractions were of the same general character.289
The fact that all five of the above statutes were enacted
during the past decade may be indicative of a modern legis-
lative trend toward complete abolition of recrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding pages have considered the present status of
recrimination in the United States and England, the history
of the doctrine, the legalistic and policy-oriented reasons ad-
vanced in justification of the rule, the evils of the doctrine,
and the various statutory and judicial efforts to restrict the
rule's operation or to eliminate it altogether.
Principal among the evils noted are the distinct tendency
of recrimination to encourage illicit alliances and pre-di-
vorce blackmail2 90 and the fact that the doctrine perpetuates
286. Id. at 464, quoting from Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 345 P.2d 888
(Okla. 1959). Admittedly, since incompatibility is a non-culpatory ground,
the court could doubtlessly have granted the plaintiff a divorce without
invoking the aid of the Oklahoma statute. Cases cited note 257 supra.
However, it is clear from the opinion that the court was relying on the
statute and not on the principle that the use of recrimination is inappro-
priate when the divorce petition is based upon a non-culpatory ground.
287. WAsn. Rnv. CODE § 26.08.150 (1966).
288. 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 228 (1966); Flagg v.
Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P.2d 189 (1937); Huff v. Huff, 178 Wash. 684,
35 P.2d 86 (1934). Although they applied comparative rectitude, the Wash-
ington courts did not use the term itself.
289. Hokamp v. Hokamp, 132 Wash. 2d 593, 203 P.2d 357 (1949); Mc-
Millan v. McMillan, 113 Wash. 250, 193 P. 673 (1920).
290. This term has reference to the extortionary pre-divorce bargaining
that recrimination makes possible. The spouse who is less anxious to termi-
nate the marriage (or who is simply more adept at bargaining) can often
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the unhappiness of mismated couples. It seems apparent that
these objectionable features vastly outweigh the questionable
merits of the rule. A substantial number of courts and legis-
latures have come to recognize this, as evidenced by the re-
forms discussed in part V, and it appears probable that the
doctrine of recrimination will eventually go the way of the
dinosaur.
obtain exorbitant financial concessions from his mate by threatening to
disclose a recriminatory offense.
[I]t [recrimination] exerts a corrupting influence on the nego-
tiations that precede the entry of such a default. The spouse
who more desperately seeks an end to a hopeless union is pen-
alized by the ability of the other spouse to prevent a divorce
through the assertion of a recriminatory defense, and the more
unscrupulous partner may obtain substantial concessions as the
price of remaining silent.
Do Burgh v. Do Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598, 604 (1952).
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